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Abstract
In many decisions under uncertainty, there are constraints on both the available
information and the feasible actions. The agent can only make certain observations of
the state space, and she cannot make them with perfect accuracy —she has imperfect
perception. Likewise, she can only perform acts that transform states continuously
into outcomes, and perhaps satisfy other regularity conditions. To incorporate such
constraints, we modify the Savage decision model by endowing the state space S and
outcome space X with topological structures. We axiomatically characterize a Sub-
jective Expected Utility (SEU) representation of conditional preferences, involving a
continuous utility function on X (unique up to positive affine transformations), and
a unique probability measure on a Boolean algebra B of regular open subsets of S.
We also obtain SEU representations involving a Borel measure on the Stone space of
B — a “subjective” state space encoding the agent’s imperfect perception.
Keywords: Subjective expected utility; imperfect perception; technological feasi-
bility; topological space; continuous utility; regular open set; Borel measure.
JEL classification: D81.
1 Introduction
Consider the following decision problems.
(a) Doctor Ali is considering several drug treatment options for a patient. The efficacy of
each drug is a continuous function of the patient’s blood chemistry, blood pressure, and
other physiological variables. But many of these variables are unknown and either they
are unmeasurable, or the available instruments are unreliable and imprecise.
(b) Bryant Heavy Industries (BHI) is about to build a new factory. Several different
factory designs are available, using different machines and production processes. The
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future profitability of each design is a continuous function of the unpredictable market
prices of several raw materials and of BHI’s final products.
(c) The Climate Emergency Panel (CEP) is considering policies to deal with climate change,
including decarbonisation, mitigation, and geoengineering. The effectiveness of each policy
is a continuous function of atmospheric, ecological, and economic parameters. But many
parameter values are unknown, and existing measurements are unreliable and imprecise.
In all three examples, an agent must make a choice under uncertainty. The Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) model is the standard paradigm for these kinds of decisions. In
the classic axiomatic foundations of Savage (1954) (and most subsequent treatments),
uncertainty is described by a state space, and “acts” are functions from this state space into
a space of outcomes. But the Savage theory assumes that all possible functions from states
into outcomes are feasible, so that an agent can meaningfully form preferences over them.
This makes sense in decision problems where the state space has a discrete topology (e.g.
bets on coins, dice, or urns; Arrow-Debreu economies). But in the three examples above,
only continuous functions are feasible, because of the underlying technological constraints.
There is no drug that will transform the patient’s physiological state discontinuously into
a health outcome. Likewise, there is no production process where profit is a discontinuous
function of market prices. So it is ill-conceived and potentially misleading to suppose that
an agent can form preferences over such infeasible acts.
Another feature of the three examples is the nature of the information available to the
agent. In the standard Savage model, an agent can acquire information by observing an
“event” —that is, a subset of the state space —and can form preferences conditional on this
event. In the Savage model, any subset of the state space is a potentially observable event.
But in the three examples above, agents can only acquire information using unreliable and
imprecise measurement devices, and many events remain unobservable.
For example, Dr. Ali might have instruments to measure the patient’s high-density
lipoprotein cholesterol (HDLC) level, in milligrams per decilitre (mg/dL). Suppose her
instrument can only measure concentration to the nearest mg/dL. If the instrument reports
the cholesterol level as “8 mg/dL”, this means that the measured value is somewhere
between 7.5 and 8.5 mg/dL. Furthermore, the machine is susceptible to a random error of
0.3 mg/dL, so Dr. Ali can only be sure that the true level is between 7.2 and 8.8 mg/dL. If
she carefully repeats the measurement several times, she can reduce this error down to 0.05
mg/dL, in which case she will know that the true value is between 7.45 and 8.55 mg/dL.
Dr. Ali can also measure the patient’s low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDLC) level.
Again, her instrument is imperfect, so it can only report an integer value, and is susceptible
to error; a measurement of “11 mg/dL” means the measured value is between 10.5 and 11.5
mg/dL, which means that the true value is between 10.2 and 11.8 mg/dL. Unfortunately, to
prescribe the correct medecine, she needs to know whether the total cholesterol level —the
sum of HDLC and LDLC levels —is below 20 mg/dL, and she has no instrument which can
directly measure this. According to her measurements, the ordered pair (HDLC,LDLC)
is confined to the box [7.45, 8.55] × [10.2, 11.8]. But the line described by the equation
“HDLC + LDLC = 20 mg/dL” cuts through this box.
For another example, suppose that BHI has the option of investing in a production
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process that requires 0.1 kg of tellurium (Te) and 1 kg of ferro tungsten (FeW) per unit
of output, and which will only be profitable if the combined cost of the two materials is
below $70 per unit. After considerable market research (e.g. geological surveys of tellurium
deposits in Kyrgyzstan), BHI believes the world price of Te will remain between $200/kg
and $300/kg for the foreseeable future, while the price of FeW will be between $20/kg and
$60/kg. Thus, the price vector (Te,FeW) must be in the box [200, 300]× [20, 60]. But the
line described by the equation “0.1 Te + FeW = $70” cuts diagonally through this box.
Furthermore, some events are simply impossible to observe. For example, it might be
diagnostically useful for Dr. Ali to measure the patient’s triglyceride levels, but perhaps
she has no device which can do this. Likewise, the effects of different climate policies
may depend partly on the structure of the methane clathrate deposits at the bottom of
the Barents Sea. But it may be impossible to make any precise measurements of these
deposits. So the CEP cannot condition its plans on such measurements.
One could apply the Savage approach directly to these kinds of decision problems. But
this would require the agent to form preferences over infeasible acts and to condition these
preferences on unobservable events. This undermines the plausibility of the preference rela-
tion, the axioms, and the resulting SEU representation —whether interpreted normatively
or descriptively. For these reasons, imperfect perception and technological constraints re-
quire a substantial departure from the Savage framework; this is the topic of this paper.
First, we introduce a new model of imperfect perception; then, we use this model to analyse
decisions under uncertainty with imperfect perception and technological constraints. We
do this by enriching Savage’s state space and outcome space with topological structure.
Our model of imperfect perception has three aspects. First, we assume that the agent is
only able to acquire information about the state by observing it through a finite partition of
the state space. For example, Dr. Ali is only able to measure the patient’s HDLC levels to
the nearest mg/dL. It might be diagnostically useful to measure it to the nearest microgram
per decilitre, but her instruments cannot do this. Second, only some finite partitions are
observable. For example, Dr. Ali is only able to measure certain physiological variables;
she has no way to directly measure total cholesterol or trigliceride levels. Likewise, BHI
cannot directly estimate the price of the Te-FeW mixture, and the CEP cannot precisely
measure the methane clathrate deposits. Finally, even for those measurements the agent
can make, there may be a small amount of random error. The agent might be able to make
this error arbitrarily small, but she cannot reduce it to zero. So Dr. Ali can only really
determine that HDLC levels are between 7.5−  and 8.5 +  mg/dL, for some small .
To capture these three aspects, we suppose that the agent’s information about the
state arrives through a regular partition of the state space S. For example, there might
be an open, continuous function φ from S to some closed interval [a, b] of real numbers
(representing some numerical “measurement”, e.g. the HDLC level in mg/dL), along with
a finite set of threshold values a = h0 < h1 < · · · < hN = z such that the agent can only
observe events of the form “hn−1− < φ(s) < hn+” (for some n ∈ [1 . . . N ]), where s is the
true state of the world and  > 0 is some measurement error. If she can make  arbitrarily
small, the agent can, in the limit, observe events of the form “hn−1 ≤ φ(s) ≤ hn”. In other
words, she can observe the events φ−1[hn−1, hn], for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. These are closed
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subsets of S, which overlap on their boundaries. For technical reasons, it is simpler (and
for our purposes, equivalent) to represent these sets by their interiors, which are the events
R1, . . . ,RN , where Rn := φ−1(hn−1, hn) (because φ is continuous and open). These are
regular subsets of S, and their union R1 unionsq · · · unionsq RN is dense in S —we call this a regular
partition of S. This is the basic unit of information available to the agent in our model.
Furthermore, only certain regular partitions might be available —for example, because
only certain real-valued functions φ can be used in the above construction, because only
certain “measurements” are technologically feasible. The collection of all feasible regular
partitions generates a Boolean algebra B. This is the algebra of all events which are ob-
servable, either directly or indirectly, by the agent. Any conditional preferences she forms
must be conditional on events in B. Meanwhile, our model represents technological con-
straints on the feasible actions by defining them as continuous functions from the state
space onto the outcome space. The domain A of feasible acts need not contain all con-
tinuous functions; thus, our framework can incorporate further technological restrictions.
The agent’s conditional preferences rank acts in A conditional upon events in B.
Despite these limitations, our main results provide axiomatic characterizations of SEU
representations for conditional preferences. In these representations, utility is a continuous
function; thus, similar outcomes yield similar utility levels. This makes our representations
particularly relevant to applications in economics and finance, which usually take continuity
for granted (Gollier, 2001). Moreover, beliefs are described by what we call a credence, a
structure like a finitely additive probability measure on the Boolean algebra B (Theorem
1). Finally, under an additional assumption on B, beliefs can also be represented by a
classical Borel probability measure on the Stone space of B —a “subjective” state space
extending the initial state space (Theorem 2).
Technological constraints introduce some obstacles into the axiomatization of SEU. For
example, Savage’s axioms (e.g. the Sure Thing Principle) and his construction of condi-
tional preferences depend on the ability to splice any two acts on any binary partition of the
state space. Furthermore, Savage obtains the subjective probability measure and utility
function by restricting preferences to two-valued acts and finitely-valued acts respectively.
But both spliced acts and finitely-valued acts are typically discontinuous, and hence inad-
missible in our framework. Furthermore, Savage’s axiom P6 (Small event continuity) relies
on a rich collection of classical partitions of the state space. But in our model of imperfect
perception, only certain regular partitions of the state space are available.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our model of imperfect
perception. Section 3 introduces the notation and terminology of our model of decisions
under uncertainty. Section 4 introduces the six axioms used in our results. Section 5
presents the SEU representation, in terms of a credence on a Boolean subalgebra B of
regular sets, while Section 6 presents the Stonean SEU representation, which relies on
a Borel probability measure on the Stone space of B. Section 7 contains variants and
extensions of our SEU representations. Section 8 reviews prior literature. All the proofs
are in the Appendices. Appendix A contains the proof of Theorem 1, which is the lynchpin
result of the paper. Appendix B proves the variants and extensions of Theorem 1.
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2 Imperfect perception
Let S be a topological space, which we interpret as the set of possible states of nature. An
open subset R ⊆ S is regular if R is the interior of its own closure. For example, any open
interval is a regular subset of R. The union of any two non-touching open intervals is also
regular. However, the union (0, 1)unionsq (1, 2) is not regular, because the interior of its closure
is the interval (0, 2). The interior of any closed set is regular.
The intersection of two regular subsets is another regular subset. Given any two regular
subsets D, E ⊆ S, we define their join to be D ∨ E := int[clos(D ∪ E)] (the interior of the
closure of D ∪ E). This is the smallest regular set containing both D and E . Meanwhile,
given a regular subset D, we define ¬D to be the interior of S \D —another regular subset.
The set R(S) of all regular subsets of S forms a Boolean algebra under the operations ∨,
∩, and ¬ (Fremlin, 2004, Theorem 314P). For example, we noted that (0, 1)unionsq(1, 2) is not a
regular subset of R. But (0, 1)∨ (1, 2) = (0, 2) is indeed regular. Likewise, the set-theoretic
complement of (0, 1) is not regular, but its interior, ¬(0, 1) = (−∞, 0) ∪ (1,∞), is.1
A regular partition of S is a collection R1, . . . ,RN of disjoint regular subsets such that
R1 ∨ · · · ∨ RN = S —equivalently, such that R1 unionsq · · · unionsq RN is dense in S. As we already
hinted in the introduction, we will represent the agent’s imperfect perception of the state
space by a collection such regular partitions —or more precisely, by the Boolean subalgebra
of R(S) which is generated by them. We will illustrate this with two models.
2.1 Imperfect measurement technology
Let R := [−∞,∞] be the extended real line, with the natural topology.2 We will represent
a “measurement” as a function φ : S−→R with two properties:3
(i) (Stability) Small changes in the state only cause small changes in the measured value.
(ii) (Sensitivity) For any state s in S, any small change in the value measured at s can be
achieved by some small perturbation of s.
Formally, property (i) means that φ is continuous everwhere on S. Meanwhile, property
(ii) means that φ is an open function. Thus (i) and (ii) together imply that φ is an
open, continuous, R-valued function on S. As noted in the introduction, the agent cannot
perceive the precise value of φ. Real-life instruments do not display their measurements
with infinitely many digits of precision. (Even if they did, humans could not absorb this
information.) Thus, the agent’s perception of the measurement value is filtered through
some finite partition of R into intervals. Formally, we define a measurement instrument
1What we call “regular” sets are often called regular open sets. Symmetrically, a subset Q ⊆ S is regular
closed if Q = clos[int(Q)] —or equivalently, if Q{ is regular open. The regular closed sets form a Boolean
algebra which is dual to the regular open sets. Thus, we could have developed the entire theory of this
paper using regular closed sets instead of regular open sets.
2That is: R has the usual topology, while neighbourhoods of ∞ and −∞ are of the form (r,∞] and
[−∞, r), respectively, for any r ∈ R. So [−∞,∞] is homeomorphic to [−1, 1] in the obvious way.
3We could equivalently regard φ as an open continuous function into a finite interval like [0, 1], if desired.
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to be an ordered pair (φ,H), where φ : S−→R is an open, continuous function, and
H = {h0 < h1 < h2 < · · · < hN} ⊂ R is a finite set of “threshold” values, where by
convention we fix h0 := −∞ and hN :=∞. We assume the agent is able to observe events
of the form “the measured value is between hn−1 and hn” for each n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Formally, this corresponds to the subset φ−1[hn−1, hn] in S. If the agent could make one
or both of these inequalities sharp, then she could even perceive events like φ−1[hn−1, hn)
or φ−1(hn−1, hn). But the measurement device inevitably has some small amount of error
—call it . Thus, in practice, the agent is only able to observe events of the form φ−1(hn−1−
, hn+).
4 By carefully repeating the measurement many times, or by otherwise expending
resources to increase precision, the agent can make  arbitrarily small, but she cannot
reduce it to zero. In the limit, she can observe the event Fn :=
⋂
>0 φ
−1(hn−1− , hn + ).
It is easily verified that in fact Fn = φ−1[hn−1, hn], a closed subset of S.
The family {F1, . . . ,FN} covers S. But for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], the sets Fn−1 and Fn
overlap on their common boundary φ−1{hn}. So {F1, . . . ,FN} is not a partition of S. For
all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Gn be the event that the state is not in Fm for any m 6= n. Formally,
Gn := S \ (F1 ∪ F2 ∪ · · · Fn−1 ∪ Fn+1 ∪ · · · ∪ FN). (1)
To understand this construction, note that Gn is precisely the set of states where the agent
can be sure that hn−1 ≤ φ(s) ≤ hn, after sufficiently precise measurements. The following
facts are easily verified: (i) G1 = φ−1[−∞, h1), GN = φ−1(hN−1,∞], and Gn = φ−1(hn−1, hn)
for all n ∈ [2 . . . N − 1]; (ii) for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], Gn = int[Fn];5 (iii) thus, Gn is a regular
subset of S; and (iv) the collection G = {G1, . . . ,GN} is a regular partition of S. We will
use G to represent the information the agent can obtain from the measurement instrument
(φ,H). When we say “The agent observes Gn”, this means that the instrument has returned
a reading which tells her that the measured value is in the interval [hn−1, hn], which means
that the true value is in the interval (hn−1 − , hn + ) (for some arbitrarily small  > 0).
Importantly, when the agent “observes” Gn, the only thing she knows for sure is that the
true state is in Fn —in particular, the state may lie on the boundary ∂Gn = φ−1{hn−1, hn}.
A measurement technology is a collection M of measurement instruments. Let BM be
the Boolean subalgebra of R(S) generated by all sets of the form φ−1(hn, hm), for any
instrument (φ,H) ∈ M and any hn, hm ∈ H, under application of the operations ∨, ¬,
and ∩. This is the Boolean algebra of all possible events in the state space which the agent
can observe through any combination of measurements with her technology.
To see why it is appropriate to close the observable events under ∨ and ¬, fix n,m ∈
[1 . . . N ] with n ≤ m and let Gn,m be the event that the state is not in Fp for any p 6= n,m.
Formally,
Gn,m := S \ (F1 ∪ F2 ∪ · · · Fn−1 ∪ Fn+1 ∪ · · · Fm−1 ∪ Fm+1 ∪ . . . ∪ FN).
Thus, Gn,m is the set of states where, after sufficiently precise measurements, the agent can
be sure that the true state is either in Fn or in Fm. It is easily verified that Gn,m = Gn∨Gm.
4Here we define −∞−  = −∞ and ∞+  =∞.
5It is important here that φ is both continuous and open.
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(b) (c) (d)(a)
Figure 1: The Boolean subalgebras from Examples 2 to 5. (a) A typical element of Bprx(R2). (b) A
typical element of Bbox(R2). (c) A typical element of Bpoly(R2). (d) A typical element of Bsmth(R2).
(Note that in each case, the negation of the shaded set is also an element of the algebra in question.)
Likewise, for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Gn be the event that the state is not in Fn. Formally,
Gn := S \ Fn. It is then easy to see that Gn = ¬Gn. Hence, the regular operations ∨ and
¬ represent the appropriate logical connectives for the set of observable events.
Typically, a measurement technologyM has the formM = Φ×H, where Φ is a set of
all open, continous functions from S into R satisfying certain “regularity” conditions, and
where H is the set of all finite subsets H = {−∞ = h0 < h1 < h2 < · · · < hN = ∞}. We
define BΦ := BΦ×H.
Example 1. Let S = R, and let Φ be the set of all open, continuous, R-valued functions
on S. Let Bas(R) be the Boolean algebra consisting of all basic sets; that is, finite disjoint
unions of the form (a1, b1) unionsq (a2, b2) unionsq · · · unionsq (aN , bN), where −∞ ≤ a1 < b1 < a2 < b2 <
· · · < aN < bN ≤ ∞. Then Bas(R) is the Boolean algebra of Φ-observable events. To
see this, note that any open, continuous function φ : R−→R is either strictly increasing or
strictly decreasing. Thus, for any h, h′ ∈ R, the preimage φ−1(h, h′) is an open interval.
Any element of BΦ is a finite join of intersections of such intervals. ♦
Example 2. (Proximity measurements) Let S = RN . For any s ∈ S, define φs : S−→R+
by setting φs(t) := d(s, t) for all t ∈ S. Let Φprx = {φs; s ∈ S}. It is easily verified that
these functions are all open and continuous.
Let Bprx(RN) be the collection of all regular subsets of RN constructed by taking joins
and/or intersections of finite collections of open balls and/or the complements of their
closures. Then Bprx(RN) is a Boolean subalgebra of R(RN). A typical element is shown in
Figure 1(a). It is easily verified that Bprx(RN) = BΦprx . This algebra describes the infor-
mation available to an agent whose measurement technology allows her to check whether
the true state within a specified proximity of some target state. (For example, she can
check the statement, “The true state is within distance 1.6 of the point (0, 0, 0)”.) ♦
Example 3. (Coordinate projections and boxes) Again, let S = RN , but now let Φbox :=
{pi1, pi2, . . . , piN}, where pin : RN−→R is the projection onto the nth coordinate. Clearly
these projections are open and continuous.
A subset of RN is an open box if it is a Cartesian product of open intervals. Any open
box is regular. The intersection of two open boxes is also an open box (if it is nonempty).
Let Bbox(RN) be the Boolean subalgebra of R(RN) generated by open boxes. A typical
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element is shown in Figure 1(b). It is easily verified that Bbox(RN) = BΦbox . This algebra
describes the information available to an agent whose measurement technology allows her
to check whether any particular coordinate of the true state satisfies some strict inequality.
(For example, she can check the statement, “The horizontal coordinate of the state is
strictly between 1.16 and 3.24.”). ♦
Example 4. (Affine measurements and polyhedra) Again, let S = RN , but now let Φpoly
be the set of all nonconstant affine functions from S to R. (A function φ : RN−→R is
affine if φ = φ0 + r for some linear function φ0 : RN−→R and some constant r ∈ R.)
A subset H ⊆ RN is a hyperplane if there is a (nontrivial) linear function φ : RN−→R
such thatH := φ−1{r} for some r ∈ R. A regular subsetR ⊆ RN is a polyhedron if there is a
finite collectionH1,H2, . . . ,HN of hyperplanes such that ∂R = (H1∩∂R)∪· · ·∪(HN∩∂R).
(Heuristically, each of the sets Hn ∩ ∂R is one of the “faces” of the polyhedron. Note that
we do not require these polyhedra to be convex, or even connected.) Let Bpoly(RN) be the
set of regular polyhedra; then Bpoly(RN) is a Boolean subalgebra of R(RN). A typical
element is shown in Figure 1(c). It is easily verified that Bpoly(RN) = BΦpoly . This algebra
describes the information available to an agent whose measurement technology allows her
to check whether the state satisfies any finite collection of strict linear inequalities.6 ♦
Example 5. (Differentiable measurements) Let S be an open subset of RN , and let
Φsmth := {φ : S−→R; φ is differentiable and dφ is everywhere nonzero}. Then Φsmth is a
collection of continuous, open functions (by the Open Mapping Theorem).
A subsetH ⊆ RN is a smooth hypersurface if there is a differentiable function φ : RN−→R
such that H := φ−1{r} for some r ∈ R, and such that dφ(h) 6= 0 for all h ∈ H. We will say
that a regular subset R ⊆ S has a piecewise smooth boundary if there is a finite collection
H1,H2, . . . ,HN of smooth hypersurfaces such that ∂R = (H1∩∂R)∪· · ·∪(HN ∩∂R). Let
Bsmth(RN) be the set of regular subsets of RN with piecewise smooth boundaries. A typical
element is shown in Figure 1(d). It is easily verified that Bsmth(RN) = BΦsmth . This algebra
describes the information available to an agent whose measurement technology allows her
to check whether the state satisfies any finite collection of strict inequalities based on
differentiable functions. We normally assume that the output of any scientific instrument
is a differentiable function of the true state of the world; thus, Bsmth(RN) describes the
information available through such scientific instruments.7 ♦
In Examples 1 to 5, all measurements ranged over R. But if S is a compact space, then
we must allow R-valued measurements, because there are no open continuous functions
from a compact space into R. For instance, Example 5 can be generalized to any smooth
manifold S, by defining Φsmth to be the set of Morse functions on S (Pivato and Vergopou-
los, 2018c, Example 4.2(b)). But if S is a compact manifold, then these functions must
range over a closed interval (which we can take to be R without loss of generality).
6This construction works if S is any topological vector space. But we must then stipulate that φ is
continuous as well as linear.
7We can also construct subalgebras of Bsmth(RN ) using subsets of Φsmth (e.g. polynomials).
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2.2 Imperfect observations of a metric space
The construction in Section 2.1 is fairly general, but it does not cover all cases of inter-
est. First, it does not seem possible to obtain the entire Boolean algebra R(RN) from a
measurement technology. Second, if S is a totally disconnected space (e.g. a Cantor set),
then there are no open continuous functions from S into R; thus, we cannot represent any
regular subset of S in terms of such “measurement instruments”. So we will now introduce
a second and more general model of imperfect perception. In this case, we will suppose
that the state space S is a metric space.
Let ψ : S−→[1 . . . N ] be an arbitrary function, representing an “observation device”.
For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Pn := ψ−1{n}; then {P1, . . . ,PN} be is a partition of S —that is,
P1, . . . ,PN are disjoint, and P1 unionsq · · · unionsq PN = S. As in Section 2.1, these observations are
subject to some error of size  > 0, but now this error is measured in terms of the metric
of S. If the device reports the reading “n”, then the agent does not know for sure that the
true state lies in Pn; she only knows that it lies in the -neighbourhood Pn, defined
Pn := {s ∈ S ; d(s, p) <  for some p ∈ Pn}. (2)
Again, by making repeated, careful observations, the agent can make  very small, but she





It is easily verified that Fn := clos(Pn).8 Once again, the collection {F1, . . . ,FN} covers S,
but it is is not a partition of S, because these sets may overlap on the topological boundaries
of the sets P1, . . . ,PN . For any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we could define Gn as in formula (1). But
assertions (ii)-(iv) beneath formula (1) are not necessarily true. The reason is simple: if
P1, . . . ,PN are arbitrary subsets of S, then their boundaries may cover large regions in S.
(Indeed, if Pn is dense in S, then ∂Pn = S). Thus, the aforementioned -imprecision in
observation, even in the limit when  is reduced to zero, may almost completely destroy
whatever information was carried in the original partition P.
To avoid this problem, the agent must make observations using “neat” partitions of S.
A subset P ⊆ S is neat if (i) int[clos(P)] ⊆ P and (ii) P ⊆ clos[int(P)]. Inclusion (ii)
means that every element of P is a cluster point of its interior. Inclusion (i) is equivalent
to saying that int(P) = int[clos(P)]; in other words, the interior of P is as large as it can
be, inside clos(P). In particular, int(P) is regular. It is easily verified that P is neat if and
only if P{ is neat. (However, the collection of neat sets does not form a Boolean algebra.)
Also, if P is neat, then its boundary ∂P is nowhere dense. A partition {P1, . . . ,PN}
is neat if P1, . . . ,PN are neat. For example, if (φ,H) is a measurement technology (as
defined in Section 2.1), then for all h, h′ ∈ H, the set φ−1[h, h′) is neat; thus, the partition
{φ−1[−∞, h1), φ−1[h1, h2), . . . , φ−1[hn−2, hn−1), φ−1[hn−1,∞]} is neat.
8The argument of this section does not crucially rely on the existence of a metric on S. Assuming only
a topology, we would get the same results by directly defining Fn := clos(Pn).
9
Let P = {P1, . . . ,PN} be a neat partition. For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], define Fn using
formulae (2) and (3), and then define Gn via formula (1). It is now easy to verify assertions
(ii)-(iv) beneath formula (1). In particular, G := {G1, . . . ,GN} is a regular partition of
S. We will use G to represent the information the agent learns from the observation
represented by P. When we say “The agent observes Gn”, this means her device reports
“n”, which only means that the true value is in the neighbourhood Pn (for some arbitrarily
small  > 0). Importantly, when she “observes” Gn, the only thing she knows for sure is
that the true state is in Fn —in particular, the state may lie on the boundary ∂Gn.
We define an observation technology to be a collection O of neat partitions of S; this
can be seen as a generalization of the measurement technologies introduced in Section 2.1.
Given an observation technology O, let BO be the subalgebra of R(S) generated by all
elements Gn defined using formula (1) as in the previous paragraph, under application of
∨, ∩ and ¬. This is the Boolean algebra of all possible events which the agent can learn
through any combination of observations via her technology. In particular, if we allow O
to be the set of all neat partitions of S, then BO = R(S).
There are several other models of “imperfect perception” which lead to regular parti-
tions. In one of these, observations are represented by upper hemicontinuous multifunctions
from S into a finite set. In another, observations are represented by random neat partitions
of S (with the randomness concentrated on the boundaries). Finally, if we suppose that
meager subsets of S have “measure zero”, then we only need to define partitions “almost
everywhere”, as is typically done in classical probability theory. In this case, regular par-
titions emerge as canonical representatives of these a.e. equivalence classes. However, the
technical details of these alternative interpretations are beyond the scope of this paper; we
refer the reader to Pivato and Vergopoulos (2018a) for details.
3 Acts and preferences
Let S and X be topological spaces. As in Section 2, elements of S represent states of
nature. Elements of X are called outcomes ; they represent the possible consequences of
actions. We will assume X is connected.
Information. We will represent the agent’s imperfect perception by means of two Boolean
subalgebras B ⊆ R(S) and D ⊆ R(X ), as explained in Section 2. If B ∈ B, then a B-
partition of B is a collection {B1, . . . ,BN} (for some N ∈ N) of disjoint elements of B such
that B = B1 ∨ · · · ∨ BN . We define D-partitions similarly. We suppose that the agent can
only observe states and outcomes through B-partitions and D-partitions.
Acts. Like Savage, we will suppose that the agent can choose from a menu of acts, where
each act is a function from the state space onto the outcome space. This function describes
the outcome that would result from the choice of this act at each possible state of the world.
Unlike Savage, we will assume that only continuous acts are feasible.
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Recall that a subset Y ⊆ X is relatively compact if its closure clos(Y) is compact.
(It follows that any continuous, real-valued function on X is bounded when restricted
to Y .) For example, if X is a metric space, then Y is relatively compact if and only
if Y is a bounded subset of X . A function α : S−→X is bounded if its image α(S) is
relatively compact in X . If X is a metric space, then this agrees with the usual definition
of “bounded”. But this definition makes sense even if X is nonmetrizable. Let C(S,X ) be
the set of all continuous functions from S into X , and let Cb(S,X ) be the set of all bounded
continuous functions from S into X . We will assume that all feasible acts lie in Cb(S,X ).
An act can indirectly yield information about the state. To see this, let α : S−→X be
an act, and let s ∈ S be the state. The agent can acquire information about s by first
applying α to s and then obtaining D-observable information about α(s). In a model with
perfect perception, we would formalize this by saying that, for any D ∈ D, the agent can
check whether α(s) is in D. But we are assuming imperfect perception. So the agent can
only learn whether α(s) is in clos(D). Thus, if she is obtaining information about the state
of the world via α, then she can only learn whether s is α−1 [clos(D)]. As in Section 2,
we represent this observation with the regular set int (α−1 [clos(D)]). Roughly speaking,
we say that α is “comeasurable” if this observation conveys no new information about the
state, beyond the information already contained in the algebra B. Formally, a continuous
function α : S−→X is comeasurable with respect to B and D (or (B,D)-comeasurable) if
int (α−1 [clos(D)]) ∈ B for all D ∈ D.
Example 6. (a) If α : S−→X is any continuous function, then α is comeasurable with
respect to R(S) and R(X ) (because the interior of any closed set is regular).
(b) Let S = X = R, and let B = D = Bas(R) be the Boolean algebra of basic sets
from Example 1. A continuous function α : R−→R is (B,D)-comeasurable if there is a
finite sequence of points −∞ = r0 < r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rN = ∞ such that for each
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], either φ is non-increasing on (rn−1, rn), or φ is non-decreasing on (rn−1, rn).
In particular, any polynomial is (B,D)-comeasurable, as is any non-decreasing or non-
increasing continuous function. But φ(x) = sin(x) is not (B,D)-comeasurable.
(c) Let S = RN and X = RM and let B = Bpoly(RN) and D = Bpoly(RM) be the algebras
of regular polyhedra, from Example 4. A function φ : RN−→RM is affine if φ = f0 + r
for some linear function f0 : RN−→RM and some constant r ∈ RM . We say φ is piecewise
affine if there is a partition P = {P1, . . . ,PN} of RN into regular polyhedra, and a set
φ1, . . . , φN : RN−→RM of affine functions, such that fRn = φnRn for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Any
continuous piecewise affine function from RN to RM is (B,D)-comeasurable.
(d) Again, let S = RN and X = RM and let B = Bsmth(RN) and D = Bsmth(RM) be
the Boolean algebras of regular sets with piecewise smooth boundaries, from Example 5.
If φ : RN−→RM is any differentiable function such that the Jacobian matrix Dφ(s) is
nonsingular for all s ∈ RN , then φ is (B,D)-comeasurable. ♦
Let Cb(S,B;X ,D) denote the set of bounded, (B,D)-comeasurable and continuous func-
tions from S to X . We will assume that all feasible acts lie in Cb(S,B;X ,D). There
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may be additional feasibility restrictions on acts, beyond boundedness, comeasurability
and continuity. Thus, we introduce an exogenously given subset A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D); this
is the set of feasible acts. In general, A could be much smaller than Cb(S,B;X ,D). For
instance, in the case where B = R(S) and D = R(X ), if feasible production plans must be
infinitely differentiable, then we could define A to be the set of all bounded and infinitely
differentiable functions from S to X . However, the collection A cannot be too small; it
must be large enough to satisfy structural condition (Rch) below, and must contain all
constant acts; these represents riskless alternatives. The inclusion of such acts in A means
that we can risklessly obtain any outcome by a feasible act.
Conditional preference structures. Savage (1954) started from a preference order on
the set of unconditional acts. He then obtained conditional preferences via axiom P2 (the
Sure Thing Principle). Axiom P2 assumes that, for any two feasible acts α and β, and
any event B, the “spliced” act αBβ (which is equal to α on B and to β on the complement
B{) is also feasible. But such “spliced” acts are often discontinuous, hence, inadmissible in
our framework. So instead of defining conditional preferences implicitly via P2, we must
assume they exist explicitly. But we will only assume that these preferences can rank
feasible acts, and we only assume preferences conditional on observable events. Thus, in
terms of its primitive behavioral data, our model is not directly comparable to the Savage
(1954) theory: while Savage assumed a single preference order on the universal domain of
acts, our approach relies on a collection of preference orders on a more restrictive domain.
But compared to other conditional versions of SEU (e.g. Ghirardato, 2002), our approach
requires less data, both in terms of the number of preference orders and their domain.
For any B ∈ B, and any α ∈ A, let αB denote the restriction of α to a function on B.
Let A(B) := {αB; α ∈ A} be the set of acts conditional upon B. Let B be a preference
order on A(B). We interpret B as the conditional preferences over A(B) of an agent who,
after sufficiently precise measurements, learns that the true state lies in the closure of B.
We will therefore refer to the system {B}B∈B as a conditional preference structure; this
will be the primitive data of the model. Our goal is to axiomatically characterize an SEU
representation for {B}B∈B.
The richness condition. As already noted, the restriction to continuous acts means
that we cannot rely on “spliced” acts the way that Savage did. Instead, we will require
the set A of feasible acts to satisfy a “richness” condition with respect to the conditional
preference structure {B}B∈B. Let B1,B2 ∈ B be disjoint regular subsets of S. For any
α1 ∈ A(B1) and α2 ∈ A(B2), say that α1 and α2 are compatible if there is some α ∈ A
with αB1 = α1 and αB2 = α2. We need A to satisfy the following condition:
(Rch) For any disjoint regular subsets B1,B2 ∈ B, and any α1 ∈ A(B1) and α2 ∈ A(B2),
there is an act β2 ∈ A(B2) which is compatible with α1, such that α2 ≈B2 β2.
In other words, the values of an act on a regular subset B1 do not restrict the indifference
class of that act conditional upon the disjoint regular subset B2, in spite of the continuity























Figure 2: Top row. α1 is compatible with α2. Bottom row. The richness condition.
not very restrictive; often, every element of A(B2) is compatible with α1. The nontrivial
case of (Rch) is when B1 and B2 are “touching” –e.g. when B1 = ¬B2. In this case, (Rch)
provides a weak version of Savage’s act splicing: For any B ∈ B, and any α, β ∈ A, there
is some γ ∈ A that is equal to α on B and indifferent to β¬B conditional on ¬B. (Rch) is
also similar to solvability, a condition often used in axiomatizations of additive utility.
A need not contain all bounded continuous functions from S to X , as long as it satisfies
(Rch) and contains all constant acts. For example, suppose S and X are differentiable
manifolds (e.g. open subsets of Euclidean spaces RN and RM , for some N,M ≥ 1), and
let A be the set of all differentiable functions from S to C; then a conditional preference
structure on A can easily satisfy (Rch) along with our other axioms.9 Alternatively, let
S and X be metric spaces, let c ∈ (0, 1], and let A be the set of all c-Ho¨lder-continuous
functions from S to X ; then (Rch) is easily satisfied.10 Or, let S be a bounded interval in
R, let X be a path-connected metric space, and let A be the set of all continuous functions
from S into X having bounded variation; then again (Rch) is easily satisfied.11 But if S
and X are open subsets of Euclidean spaces, and A is a set of analytic functions from S to
X (e.g. polynomials), then a conditional preference structure on A cannot satisfy (Rch).12
9The same is true if A is the set of N -times differentiable functions, for any N ∈ [2 . . .∞].
10A function α : S−→X is c-Ho¨lder-continuous if there is some constant K > 0 such that d[φ(s1), φ(s2)] ≤
K ·d(s1, s2)c for all s1, s2 ∈ S. In the special case when c = 1, these are called Lipschitz-continuous functions.
Any continuously differentiable function is Lipschitz.
11A function α : [0, S]−→X has bounded variation if its “total variation” sup{∑Nn=1 d[α(sn), α(sn−1)];
N ∈ N and 0 ≤ s0 < s1 < · · · < sN ≤ S} is finite. Heuristically, this means that α does not oscillate too
violently; it describes a path through X of finite total length.
12An infinitely differentiable function α : S−→X is analytic if it is the limit of its own Taylor series in
a neighbourhood around each point in S. An analytic function can be completely reconstructed from its
behaviour in a tiny neighbourhood around any point in its domain. This means that an analytic function
defined on an open subset R ⊆ S has at most one extension to an analytic function on all of S.
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4 Axioms
Throughout the paper, we assume that each order B in the conditional preference struc-
ture {B}B∈B is complete (for any α, β ∈ A(B), at least one of α B β or β B α holds),
transitive (for any α, β, γ ∈ A(B), if α B β and β B γ, then α B γ), and nontrivial
(there exist α, β ∈ A(B) such that α B β). These assumptions are more natural in our
framework than in Savage’s: they only require a transitive ordering on feasible acts, not
on all logically possible acts. To understand the implications of this distinction, consider
a case where an agent observes event B ∈ B, and must choose between two feasible acts
α and γ in A(B). Suppose that she has preferences over unfeasible acts, and there is an
unfeasible act β such that α B β and β B γ. A blind application of transitivity would
yield α B γ. But the unfeasibility of β undermines the meaningfulness of both rankings
α B β and β B γ. Why should these two rankings influence the choice between α and
γ? By restricting preferences to feasible acts, we eliminate such spurious influences.
The separability axioms. Additive separability over disjoint events is a characteristic
feature of SEU theories. In a Savage framework, it is captured by P2. In Ghirardato’s
(2002) axiomatization, where an agent is endowed with conditional preferences, separability
is captured by the axiom of Dynamic Consistency. Dynamic Consistency also plays a
central role in Hammond’s (1988) derivation of SEU maximization on decision trees; see
also Hammond (1998, §6-§7). Our next axiom captures separability through a version of
Dynamic Consistency that only applies to regular partitions of a regular event.
(Sep) For any event B ∈ B, any disjoint events D, E ∈ B such that D ∨ E = B, and any
α, β ∈ A(B) with αD ≈D βD, we have α B β if and only if αE E βE .
In (Sep), the “forward implication” (from α B β to αE E βE) says that a feasible act
that was deemed optimal conditional on B will be still be optimal conditional on E . The
“backward implication” says that a more-informed decision is more reliable than a less-
informed decision; thus, decisions based on inferior information should be guided by the
hypothetical decisions that would have been made with superior information. In this case,
the agent should choose α over β given inferior information (B), because she recognizes
that she would be willing to choose α given superior information (either D or E).
Just as the restriction to feasible acts strengthens the appeal of the ordering axiom, the
restriction to events in B strengthens the appeal of (Sep) —more specifically, its “backward
implication”. To see this, suppose the agent must choose between two feasible acts α and
β, conditional on some B ∈ B. Say that she has preferences conditional upon events D
and E , with D ∨ E = B, such that αD ≈D βD and αE E βE . A na¨ıve application of
separability would then yield α B β. But if D and E are not elements of B, then they
are unobservable events, so it is not clear that the preferences conditional on D and E are
even meaningful, much less that they should determine the choice between α and β. The
restriction to B eliminates this problem.
It is easy to see that the logical equivalence in Axiom (Sep) also holds for indifference
and for strict preference: for any α, β ∈ A(B) with αD ≈D βD, we have:
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(i) α B β if and only if αE E βE ; and
(ii) α ≈B β if and only if αE ≈E βE .
Statement (i) means that no event in B is null. Thus, any SEU representation must give
nonzero probability to all events in B. Conversely, statement (ii) says that the boundary
of any event in B is null: the behaviour of α and β on that small part of B that is not
covered by D ∪ E is irrelevant for decisions conditional on B. This seems to suggest that
the SEU representation must give zero probability to the boundary of any regular set. But
A is a set of continuous functions; thus, the behaviour of α and β on the open sets D and
E entirely determines their behaviour on the common boundary ∂D∩∂E . Thus, statement
(ii) does not mean that we ignore the behaviour of α and β on ∂D∩ ∂E , as if ∂D∩ ∂E had
zero probability; it just means that we have already implicitly accounted for this behaviour
in our rankings of αD versus βD and αE versus βE .
If D, E ∈ B are disjoint and B = D ∨ E , then Axiom (Sep) says that the B-ranking
of two acts α, β ∈ A(B) is partly determined by the D-ranking of αD versus βD and the
E -ranking of αE versus βE . The next axiom says that this dependency is continuous.
(CCP) (Continuity of conditional preferences) Let B = D ∨ E as in axiom (Sep). Let
β, α, β ∈ A(B) be three acts with β ≺B α ≺B β. Then there exist δ, δ ∈ A(D) and
,  ∈ A(E), with δ ≺D αD ≺D δ and  ≺E αE ≺E  such that, for any α′ ∈ A(B), if
δ ≺D α′D ≺D δ and  ≺E α′E ≺E  then β ≺B α′ ≺B β.
The intuition here is that a small variation in αD and αE (relative to the order topologies
on A(D) and A(E)) should not affect the B- ranking of α versus β and β.
Measurability of ex post preferences. For any x ∈ X , let κx be the constant x-valued
act on S. Let K := {κx; x ∈ X}. We have assumed K ⊆ A, so the preference order S ,








xp describes the ex post preferences of the agent on X when there is no uncertainty. The
next axiom says that these preferences are compatible with the Boolean subalgebra D.
(M) The ex post order xp is D-measurable. That is: for all x ∈ X , the contour sets
{y ∈ X ; y xp x} and {y ∈ X ; y ≺xp x} are elements of D.
The intuition here is straightforward. The agent is aware of her own ex post preferences. So
for any x, y ∈ X , she can discern whether y satisfies the properties “y xp x” or “y ≺xp x”
—i.e. whether y belongs to the open upper or lower contour set of x. In other words, these
open contour sets must be “observable” subsets of X . But then they must belong to D.
Moreover, note that axiom (M) implies the continuity of ex post preferences with respect
to the topology on X (because every element of D is open in X ).
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Certainty equivalents. For any B ∈ B and x ∈ X , let κxB := (κx)B; this is the constant
x-valued act, conditional on B. Given an act α ∈ A(B), we say x is a certainty equivalent
for α on B if κxB ≈B α. The next axiom is a mild richness condition on X .
(CEq) For any event B ∈ B, any act α ∈ A(B) has a certainty equivalent on B.
Axiom (CEq) may appear somewhat implausible or technical. But it is a logical conse-
quence of the following axiom of “constant measurability” which may seem more natural
and has an interpretation similar to that of axiom (M).
(CM) For any event B ∈ B and any act α ∈ A(B), the sets {x ∈ X ; κxB B α} and
{x ∈ X ; α B κxB} are elements of D.
If X is connected and A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D), then (CM) is equivalent to the conjunction of
(M) and (CEq). So we could state our results with (CM) in place of (M) and (CEq).
The statewise dominance axiom. Our next axiom imposes some consistency between
the agent’s conditional preference structure and her ex post preferences. It says that the
agent always prefers a statewise dominating act.
(Dom) For any B ∈ B and any α, β ∈ A(B), if α(b) xp β(b) for all b ∈ B, then α B β.
Furthermore, for any B ∈ B and any x, y ∈ X , if x xp y, then κxB B κyB.
Recall that, although the agent has observed the event B, the state of the world might
actually be in ∂B. (Dom) says that the values of acts on ∂B do not matter for statewise
dominance. To see why this is reasonable, recall that α and β are continuous functions on
B, so they have unique extensions to clos(B), and these extensions preserve weak statewise
dominance. Thus, weak statewise dominance over B implies weak statewise dominance
over clos(B); that is, over all the states that remain possible given the observation of B.
(Dom) appears similar to (Sep), and thus to Savage’s axiom P2. The difference is that
(Sep) applies to regular partitions, while (Dom) applies to partitions into singleton sets,
which, in general, are not regular. Thus, (Dom) cannot be obtained as a special case of
(Sep). Axiom (Dom) is also related to Savage’s axioms P3 and P7. Axiom P3 requires
the ranking of outcomes to be independent of the events that yield the outcomes. (Dom)
entails a similar form of state independence: it implies that S can be replaced by B for
any B ∈ B, in formula (4). Thus, the ex post preference orders obtained from different
conditional preference orders must agree with one other. To see how (Dom) and P7 overlap,
consider the special case of (Dom) where one of α or β is a constant act. In fact, under
(CM) and as long as A only contains continuous and bounded acts, (Dom) implies P7.
Tradeoff consistency. To state the last axiom, we need some preliminary definitions.
Let B ∈ B, and let Q := ¬B. Consider an outcome x ∈ X and an act α ∈ A(Q).
Structural condition (Rch) yields an act (xBα) ∈ A with two properties:
(B1) (xBα)B ≈B κxB, and (B2) (xBα)Q ≈Q α.
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We will call (xBα) an (x, α)-bet for B; if B obtains, this bet is indifferent to the outcome
x, while it is indifferent to α conditional on the complement of B. Note that (xBα) is not
uniquely defined by (B1) and (B2). But if (xBα) and (xBα)′ are two acts satisfying (B1)
and (B2), then axiom (Sep) implies that (xBα) ≈S (xBα)′.
Fix now four outcomes x, y, v, w ∈ X , and a regular subset B ∈ B. Let Q := ¬B. We
write (x B; y)  (v B; w) if there exist α, β ∈ A(Q), an (x, α)-bet (xBα) ∈ A, a (y, β)-bet
(yBβ) ∈ A, a (v, α)-bet (vBα) ∈ A and a (w, β)-bet (wBβ) ∈ A such that (xBα) S (yBβ)
while (vBα) S (wBβ). By the remark in the previous paragraph, this implies that for any
such bets (xBα), (yBβ), (vBα), (wBβ) ∈ A, we have (xBα) S (yBβ) and (vBα) S (wBβ).
If (xBα) S (yBβ), then the “gain” obtained by changing x to y on B is at least enough
to compensate for the “loss” incurred by changing α to β on Q. In contrast, if (vBα) S
(wBβ), then the gain obtained by changing v to w on B is at most enough to compensate
for the loss incurred by changing α to β on Q. Together, these two observations imply that
the gain obtained from changing x to y on B is at least as large as the gain from changing
v to w on B; hence the notation (x B; y)  (v B; w). If S has an SEU representation
with utility function u, then (x B; y)  (v B; w) means that u(y)− u(x) ≥ u(w)− u(v).
Conversely, we write (x B; y) ≺ (v B; w) if there exist γ, δ ∈ A(Q), an (x, γ)-bet
(xBγ) ∈ A, a (y, δ)-bet (yBδ) ∈ A, a (v, γ)-bet (vBγ) ∈ A and a (w, δ)-bet (wBδ) ∈ A
such that (xBγ) S (yBδ) while (vBγ) ≺S (wBδ). Again, this implies that (xBγ) S (yBδ)
and (vBγ) ≺S (wBδ) for any such bets (xBγ), (yBδ), (vBγ), (wBδ) ∈ A. If S had an SEU
representation, then this means that u(y)− u(x) < u(w)− u(v). Here is our final axiom:
(TC) For any two regular subsets B1,B2 ∈ B, there are no x, y, v, w ∈ X such that
(x
B1
; y)  (v B1; w) while (x B2; y) ≺ (v B2; w).
In the case B1 = B2, (TC) requires “tradeoff attitudes” over outcomes to be well-defined,
independently of the acts that are used to reveal them. In the case B1 6= B2, (TC) requires
tradeoff attitudes at different regular subsets to be consistent with each other: they must
be independent of the event over which outcomes are traded. Thus, tradeoff attitudes can
be evaluated independently from the choice situation used to reveal them.
Previous axiomatizations of SEU using a tradeoff consistency axiom (e.g. Wakker’s
(1988) Cardinal Coordinate Independence) did not also require a separability axiom, be-
cause it was implied by tradeoff consistency. But our axiom (Sep) is not superseded by
(TC); to the contrary, (Sep) is necessary to even state (TC). Axiom (TC) needs “bets”’
satisfying conditions (B1) and (B2). To construct these bets, we use (Rch). But the re-
sulting construction is non-unique. To show that this non-uniqueness doesn’t matter in
our formulation of (TC), we must invoke (Sep).
5 SEU representations
Beliefs. We will represent the probabilistic “beliefs” of the agent by a credence —a
structure like a finitely additive probability measure on the Boolean algebra B. To be
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precise, a credence on B is a function µ : B−→[0, 1] such that µ[S] = 1 and such that, for











A credence µ behaves like an ordinary probability measure. For example, for any B ∈ B
with µ[B] > 0, we can define the conditional credence µB by setting µB[R] := µ[B∩R]/µ[B]
for all R ∈ B. Then µB also satisfies equation (5). We say that a credence µ has full
support if µ[B] > 0 for all nonempty B ∈ B.
An important difference from the usual definition of a measure is that additivity is
defined with respect to the operation ∨, rather than ordinary union. To explain this, it
helps to reformulate the additivity property of probability in logical terms, as follows:
If B and B′ are two mutually exclusive statements, then the probability of the
logical disjunction of B and B′ is the sum of their probabilities.
Now, suppose that statements B and B′ corresponds to some disjoint events B,B′ ∈ B.
As explained in Section 2.1, in our model of imperfect perception, the event corresponding
to the disjunction of B and B′ is not B unionsq B′, but rather, B ∨ B′. So the above principle
requires that µ[B ∨ B′] = µ[B] + µ[B′].
Example 7. (a) Let S := (0, 1), and let Bas(0, 1) be the Boolean algebra of basic open
subsets of (0, 1), as defined in Example 1. For any B ∈ Bas(0, 1), if B = (a, b) for some
a < b, then let µ[B] := b − a. Next, if B = B1 unionsq · · · unionsq BN for some disjoint open intervals
B1, . . . ,BN , then define µ[B] := µ[B1] + · · ·+ µ[BN ]. Then µ is a credence on Bas(0, 1).
(b) More generally, let S = (0, 1)N , and let λ be the Lebesgue measure on S. Let B be
the set of all regular subsets B ⊆ S such that λ[∂B] = 0. It is easily verified that B is a
Boolean subalgebra of R(S). Define µ[B] = λ[B] for all B ∈ B; then µ is a credence on B.
(Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c, Proposition 3.4). The same construction works for any
subalgebra of B; in particular, example (a) is a special case when S = (0, 1). ♦
Conditional expectation structures. From any credence, we can construct a sys-
tem of expectation functionals, which assign “expected values” to bounded, comeasurable
and continuous real-valued measurements and, in particular, to the utility profiles of fea-
sible acts. First, we need a bit of background. A continuous function h : S−→R is
B-comeasurable if, for any r ∈ R, we have int (h−1(−∞, r]) ∈ B and int [h−1[r,∞)] ∈ B.
Let C(S,R) denote the vector space of all continuous, real-valued functions on S. Let
Cb(S,R) be the Banach space of bounded, continuous, real-valued functions, with the uni-
form norm ‖·‖∞. Let CB(S) be the set of all B-comeasurable functions in Cb(S,R). This
set is not necessarily closed under addition. So, let GB(S) be the closed linear subspace
of Cb(S,R) spanned by CB(S). (If B = R(S), then GB(S) = CB(S) = Cb(S,R).) For any
subset B ⊆ S, let GB(B) := {gB; g ∈ GB(S)}. This is a linear subspace of Cb(B,R).
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An expectation functional on B is a linear functional E : GB(B)−→R such that ‖E‖∞ = 1,
and such that, for any f, g ∈ GB(B), if f(b) ≤ g(b) for all b ∈ B, then E[f ] ≤ E[g]. If 1 is
the constant function with value 1, then it follows that E[1] = 1.
Now let µ be a credence on B. A conditional expectation structure for S that is compatible
with µ is a collection E := {EB}B∈B, where, for all B ∈ B, EB is an expectation functional
on GB(B), and furthermore, if µ[B] > 0, then for any B-partition {Bn}Nn=1 of B, and any






µ[Bn]EBn [gBn ] . (6)
In particular, E = ES is an expectation functional on GB(S), and a version of equation
(6) holds for every B-partition of S. Equation (6) captures a key feature of Bayesianism:
conditional expectations are additively separable over the disjoint events of a B-partition.
Indeed, for any regular event B ∈ B with µ[B] > 0, the subcollection {ER}R∈B′ , where
B′ is the collection of sets in B that are contained in B, is itself a conditional expectation
structure on B, compatible with the conditional credence µB.
If g ∈ GB(S) and B ∈ B, we will abuse notation and write “EB[g]” to mean EB[gB].
We say E is strictly monotonic if, for all B ∈ B and g ∈ CB(B), if g(b) > 0 for all b ∈ B,
then EB[g] > 0. For every credence µ, there is a unique compatible conditional expectation
structure E; furthermore, if µ has full support, then E is strictly monotonic (see Theorem
4.3 from Pivato and Vergopoulos (2018c)). For example, let S = (0, 1)N , B ⊂ R(S) and
µ be as in Example 7(b). Then the unique µ-compatible conditional expectation structure
is defined as follows: for any B ∈ B and any g ∈ GB(B), EB[g] =
∫
B g dλ, where λ is
the Lebesgue measure on S. (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c, Example 4.1). For other
examples, see Pivato and Vergopoulos (2018c).
SEU representations. A continous function u : X−→R is D-measurable if, for all r ∈ R,
the preimage sets h−1(−∞, r) and h−1(r,∞) are elements of D. Let A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D),
and let {B}B∈B be a B-indexed conditional preference structure on A. Let u : X−→R be
a continuous D-measurable “utility” function. Let µ be a credence on B. Let {EB}B∈B be
the (unique) conditional expectation structure that is compatible with µ. The pair (u, µ)
is a subjective expected utility (SEU) representation for {B}B∈B if, for any B ∈ B and any





EB [u ◦ α] ≥ EB [u ◦ β]
)
. (7)
Since we suppose that the utility function u is D-measurable, and that all acts α ∈ A are
(B,D)-comeasurable, it follows that all utility profiles u ◦ α : S−→R are B-comeasurable
(Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c, Proposition 5.4(a)). Thus, all utility profiles of feasible
acts can be evaluated by any conditional expectation structure compatible with a credence
on B, and the SEU representation (7) is well-defined. In this SEU representation, the
utility function is continuous, but it need not be bounded, unlike Savage’s utility. This is
because we assume only bounded acts are feasible. We now come to our first main result.
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Theorem 1 Let S and X be topological spaces, with X connected. Let B and D be non-
trivial Boolean subalgebras of R(S) and R(X ) respectively. Let A be a collection of bounded
continuous and (B,D)-comeasurable functions from S into X . Let {B}B∈B be a condi-
tional preference structure on A which satisfies condition (Rch). Then, it satisfies (CEq),
(M), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), and (TC) if and only if it has an SEU representation (7) with
full support. Finally, µ is unique, and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
The SEU representation (7) axiomatically characterized in Theorem 1 portrays an agent
facing three sorts of technological constraints. First, she only has limited information about
states and outcomes —perhaps in the form of a small collection of real-valued functions
representing “feasible measurements”. Even worse, due to limitations in her instruments
or her own perception, she cannot even make these measurements precisely; instead of a
continuum of measurement values, she can only discriminate a finite set of “measurement
intervals”, which determine regular partitions of S and X . These two informational limi-
tations mean that she can only perceive events arising from some Boolean subalgebras B
and D of regular subsets of S and X . Finally, her actions are restricted to a collection A of
continuous acts, which furthermore must be comeasurable relative to B and D. However,
if she defines probabilistic beliefs in the form of a “credence” on B, then she can compute
the expected utility of every element of A, conditional on any event in B, and in this way,
she can define a conditional preference structure on A. Theorem 1 says that, given certain
rationality axioms, every conditional preference structure arises in this way.
Sketch of proof. We will sketch the main steps in the construction of the SEU repre-
sentation from the axioms. In the first step, we fix a B-partition P = {E1, . . . , EN} of S
and use (Rch) to construct a mapping ΦP : XN−→A such that ΦP(x)En ≈En κxnEn for any
n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and any x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ XN . This mapping induces a preference order








We then invoke (CCP), (M), (Dom) and (CEq) to show that this new preference order P
is continuous. By (TC), it also satisfies Cardinal Coordinate Independence. Since X is
connected, Theorem 6.2 from Wakker (1988) provides a continuous function uP : X−→R














In the next step, we show that the functions uP can be taken to be independent of P and
that the numbers µP(En) are independent from P, provided P contains En as a cell. This
follows from (Sep) and the uniqueness of Wakker’s theorem. Thus, we obtain a continuous
function u from X to R, which can be shown to be D-measurable by axiom (M). We also
obtain a function µ from B to [0, 1], which is a credence with full support.
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Finally, we show that the expected utility of any feasible act conditional on any ob-
servable event is equal to the utility of any of its certainty equivalents. The argument uses
(Sep) and (Dom), and relies on the boundedness and comeasurability of feasible acts. From
there, since (CEq) provides certainty equivalents, the SEU representation easily follows.
6 Stonean SEU representations
The Stone Representation Theorem shows that any Boolean algebra B can be represented
as a Boolean algebra of subsets of some set —the Stone space of B. This can be used to
obtain an alternative SEU representation where the agent’s beliefs are represented by the
more familiar notion of a Borel probability measure.
Borel probability measures. Let S be a topological space. Let Bor(S) be the Borel
sigma-algebra of S —that is, the smallest sigma-algebra containing all open sets. A Borel
probability measure on S is a (countably additive) probability measure on Bor(S). A Borel
probability measure µ is normal if, for every B ∈ Bor(S), we have µ[B] = sup{µ[C]; C ⊆ B
and C closed in S} and µ[B] = inf{µ[O]; B ⊆ O ⊆ S and O open in S}. Finally, it has
full support if µ(O) > 0 for any open set O in S.
Stone spaces. Let B be any Boolean algebra. A truth valuation on B is a Boolean algebra
homomorphism v : B−→T, where T := {T, F} is the two-element Boolean algebra, with
the usual operations ∨, ∧ and ¬. If B is a set of propositions about the world, each of
which may be true or false, then v is a complete, logically consistent assignment of truth
values to these propositions. Let σ(B) be the set of all truth valuations of B. For any
B ∈ B, let B∗ := {v ∈ σ(B); v(B) = T}. The collection {B∗; B ∈ B} is a base of clopen
sets for a topology on σ(B), making it into a compact, totally disconnected Hausdorff
space, called the Stone space of B.13
In particular, let S be a topological state space, and let B be a Boolean subalgebra of
R(S) representing all events which are observable to the agent. Let S∗ := σ(B) be the
Stone space of B. Then, each truth valuation s∗ ∈ S∗ is a complete subjective description
of the world, as perceived by this agent. In turn, S∗ can be interpreted as the “subjective
state space” of the agent.
Extensions of the feasible acts. Our Stonean SEU representation will use Borel prob-
ability measures on the Stone space S∗ of B, and therefore needs the feasible acts to be
extended into functions on S∗. This requires additional structural assumptions.
A topological space S is Hausdorff if any pair of points in S can be placed in two disjoint
open neighbourhoods. A Hausdorff space S is locally compact if every point in S has a
13The Boolean algebra structure of B is completely encoded in the topology of σ(B). To be precise,
the Stone Representation Theorem says that the map B 7→ B∗ is an isomorphism from B to the Boolean
algebra of clopen subsets of σ(B). Meanwhile, the Stone Duality Theorem says that σ is a functorial
isomorphism between the category of Boolean algebras and the category of compact, totally disconnected
Hausdorff spaces; see e.g. Johnstone (1986, §4.1) or Fremlin (2004, §311-§312).
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compact neighbourhood. For example, every compact Hausdorff space is locally compact.
Other examples include topological manifolds, open or closed subset of RN , and totally
bounded, locally complete metric spaces. In short: most topological spaces which would
arise naturally in economic applications are locally compact.
Let S be a locally compact Hausdorff space. There is a unique compact Hausdorff space
Sˇ, called the Stone-Cˇech compactification of S, with the following properties.
(SCˇ1) S is an open, dense subset of Sˇ, and the native topology of S is the same as the
subspace topology it inherits from Sˇ.
(SCˇ2) For any compact Hausdorff space K, and any continuous function f : S−→K, there
is a unique continuous function fˇ : Sˇ−→K such that fˇS = f .
(SCˇ3) For anyR ∈ R(S), there is a unique Rˇ ∈ R(Sˇ) such that Rˇ∩S = R. Furthermore,
the mapping R(S) 3 R 7→ Rˇ ∈ R(Sˇ) is a Boolean algebra isomorphism.14
Let S be any locally compact Hausdorff space, and let Sˇ be its Stone-Cˇech compactifi-
cation. Let B be a Boolean subalgebra of R(S), and define Bˇ := {Bˇ; B ∈ B}, where we
define Bˇ as in statement (SCˇ3). We say that B is generative if Bˇ is a base for the topology
of Sˇ. For example, the full Boolean algebra R(S) is generative (Pivato and Vergopoulos,
2018c, Lemma 8.2). If B is generative, then there is a continuous surjection p : S∗−→Sˇ
(Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c, Proposition 8.3).15 Let X be a Hausdorff space. By
statement (SCˇ2), any feasible act α ∈ Cb(S,B;X ,D) has a unique continuous extension
αˇ ∈ C(Sˇ,X ). If we define α∗ := αˇ ◦ p, then α∗ ∈ C(S∗,R). If the Stone space S∗ of B is
the subjective state space of the agent representing the uncertainty as she imperfectly per-
ceives it, each function α∗ is a subjective representation of the feasible act α incorporating
the agent’s imperfect perception of the outcomes of α.
Stonean SEU representations. Let A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D), and let {B}B∈B be a B-
indexed conditional preference structure on A. A Stonean SEU representation for {B}B∈B
is given by a normal Borel probability measure µ∗ on Bor(S∗) and a D-measurable utility






u ◦ α∗ dµ∗ ≥
∫
B∗
u ◦ β∗ dµ∗
)
. (8)
Theorem 2 Let S be a locally compact Hausdorff space, and let X be a connected Haus-
dorff space. Let B be a generative Boolean subalgebra of R(S), let D be a nontrivial Boolean
subalgebra of R(X ), and let A be a collection of bounded, continuous, (B,D)-comeasurable
functions from S into X . Let {B}B∈B be a conditional preference structure on A which
14Property (SCˇ2) holds if S is any Tychonoff space; see e.g. Theorem 19.5 of Willard (2004) or Theorem
2.79 of Aliprantis and Border (2006). But property (SCˇ3) only holds for the somewhat smaller class of
locally compact Hausdorff spaces (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c, Lemma 6.4(a)).
15 If S is compact, then Sˇ = S. If also B = R(S), then p : S∗−→S is called the Gleason cover of S; it
plays an important role in categorical topology (Johnstone, 1986, §3.10).
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satisfies condition (Rch). Then, it satisfies (CEq), (M), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), and (TC)
if and only if it admits a Stonean SEU representation (8), where µ∗ has full support on S∗.
Finally, µ∗ is unique, and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Theorems 1 and 2 use exactly the same axioms to characterize the SEU and Stonean
SEU representations. The choice between these two representations is then purely a matter
of mathematical convenience. An advantage of Stonean SEU representations lies in their
use of the classical notion of a normal Borel probability measure to represent the agent’s
beliefs. But this measure is defined on an extended and abstract version of the original
state space —namely, the Stone space of B. Moreover, Stonean SEU representations rely
on more stringent structural assumptions on S, X and, more importantly, on B.
Theorem 2 has a natural and appealing interpretation. The agent is only able to
observe the events in the algebra B. So for her, a complete subjective description of the
world is given by a (logically consistent) assignment of truth-values to the events in B —
that is, an element of S∗. The measure µ∗ assigns probabilities to such complete subjective
descriptions. Given any act α : S−→X , it is possible to represent α as a function converting
each complete subjective description into an outcome —that is, a function α∗ : S∗−→X .
The agent then ranks each act α according to the µ∗-expected utility of α∗. This may seem
peculiar, but in fact it is quite psychologically natural. Perhaps S describes the world “as
it really is”. But for the agent, S∗ describes the world as she experiences it. Thus, for her,
an SEU representation on S∗ might be more natural than one on S itself.
7 Extensions
SEU representations on R(S) and R(X ). If B = R(S) and D = R(X ), then we can
simplify Theorem 1. The following continuity axiom weakens axiom (M) by only requiring
ex post preferences to be compatible with the underlying topology on X .
(C) The ex post order xp is continuous in the topology on X . That is: for all x ∈ X , the
contour sets {y ∈ X ; y xp x} and {y ∈ X ; y xp x} are closed subsets of X .
We will say that a topological space S is nondegenerate if it contains a nonempty open
subset which is not dense —or equivalently, a proper closed subset with nonempty interior.
This means that R(S) is not trivial. Nondegeneracy is a very mild condition; for example,
any nonsingleton Hausdorff space is nondegenerate.
Theorem 3 Let S be a nondegenerate topological space, let X be a connected topological
space, and let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on
A which satisfies condition (Rch). Then, it further satisfies Axioms (CEq), (C), (Dom),
(Sep), (CCP), and (TC) if and only if it has an SEU representation (u, µ), where u is a
continuous function and µ is a credence on R(S) with full support. Finally, µ is unique,
and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
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Theorem 3 essentially shows that it is sufficient to weaken axiom (M) into axiom (C)
and, correspondingly, weaken the D-measurability of the utility function into continuity
to obtain an SEU representation, in the case where all regular subsets of S and X are
observable. Importantly, note that the D-measurability of u is not needed here for the
SEU representation to be well-defined. Indeed, since u and α are continuous, u ◦ α is also
continuous, and therefore automatically R(S)-comeasurable for any α ∈ A.
SEU representations on unbounded acts. Theorems 1 to 3 assume that all acts in
A are bounded. However, many economic applications of SEU require unbounded acts —
e.g. acts that generate Poisson or Gaussian distributions over a Euclidean outcome space.
We now present an extension of Theorem 1 to such unbounded acts. We will need three
structural assumptions involving B and A.
Let A be a collection of continuous and (B,D)-comeasurable functions from S to X
and let B be a Boolean subalgebra of R(S). For any B ∈ B, let Ab(B) be the set of all
bounded functions in A(B). Let {B}B∈B be a conditional preference structure on A.
(Exh) There exists a countable B-partition {Pn, n ∈ N} of S such that, for any s ∈ S,
s ∈ P1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn for some n ∈ N.
Condition (Exh) requires the existence of a countable B-partition “exhausting” S, as any
state must be included in the join of finitely many events in the partition. It is comparable
to Savage’s axiom (P6). Indeed, (P6) implies the nonatomicity of the subjective probability
and, therefore, the existence of countable partitions. For example, R(RN) satisfies (Exh).
Likewise, all the Boolean subalgebras from Examples 1 to 5 also satisfy (Exh).
(Loc) If α : S−→X is continuous, and for any s ∈ S, there exists a neighborhood Ns of
s and an act αs ∈ A with αNs = αsNs , then α ∈ A.
Condition (Loc) says that feasibility is a local property: if a continuous act is equal to some
feasible act locally around each point in S, then it must be feasible itself. Since Savage uses
the universal domain of acts, this condition is automatically satisfied in his framework.
(Rch*) For any disjoint B1,B2 ∈ B, and any α1 ∈ Ab(B1) and α2 ∈ Ab(B2), there is an
act β2 ∈ Ab(B2) which is compatible with α1, such that α2 ≈B2 β2. Moreover, for
any x ∈ X , if α1(s) xp x for all s ∈ B1 and α2 B2 κxB2 , then β2 can be chosen such
that β2(s) xp x for all s ∈ B2. Likewise, for any x ∈ X , if α1(s) xp x for all s ∈ B1
and α2 B2 κxB2 , then β2 can be chosen such that β2(s) xp x for all s ∈ B2.
Condition (Rch*) is a variant of (Rch) and complements it by providing finer control over
the values of spliced acts. Roughly speaking, the spliced act will not have “too low”, or
“too high”, outcomes if it does not need to. Thus, (Rch*) is a rather mild strengthening
of (Rch). We now come to the extension of Theorem 1 to unbounded acts.
Theorem 4 Let S and X be topological spaces, with X connected. Let B and D be non-
trivial Boolean subalgebras of R(S) and R(X ) respectively, with B satisfying (Exh). Let A
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be a collection of continuous and (B,D)-comeasurable functions from S into X satisfying
(Loc). Let {B}B∈B be a conditional preference structure on A which satisfies condition
(Rch*). Then, it satisfies Axioms (CEq), (M), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), and (TC) if and
only if it has an SEU representation (u, µ), with u bounded, D-measurable and µ of full
support. Finally, µ is unique, and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
The formal agument deriving Theorem 4 from Theorem 1 is very similar to Savage’s
extension of his SEU representation from finitely-valued acts to infinitely-valued ones. But
his argument heavily used the universal domain of acts and events. In contrast, we need
the conditions (Exh), (Loc) and (Rch*) to compensate for our more restricted domains.
On the other hand, Savage’s argument also relies on an additional axiom, namely (P7).
We can dispense with (P7) because we exploit the topological properties of our framework.
By comparison with Theorem 1, Theorem 4 seems to be more general because it allows for
unbounded acts. Yet it is less general in that the utility function must be bounded. This
is unavoidable because we need the utility profiles of each feasible act to be bounded, in
order for it to have a well-defined expectation with respect to the credence.
8 Related literature
In mainstream probability theory and its applications in decision theory and game theory,
an agent is endowed with a state space and a prior probability. Her information structure
is represented by a partition. At any state, she “perfectly” perceives the event in the
partition containing that state. Then the agent’s posterior beliefs at that state are given
by the Bayesian update of her prior on this event. Thus, perfectly perceptive agents can
be described in terms of a function mapping each state onto the corresponding posterior.
Caplin and Martin (2015) are among the few authors investigating decision-making
under imperfect perception. In their approach, the imperfect perception of events results in
a multiplicity of possible posteriors. More precisely, they describe the agent by a perception
function mapping each state onto a probability on possible posteriors. Thus, their approach
does not really model imperfect perception per se, but only its effect on the agent’s posterior
beliefs. In contrast, we explicitly model imperfect perception in terms of a family of
unreliable, imprecise measurement devices.16
Several previous papers have restricted the Savage universal domain of events. In fact,
Savage (1954) explicitly notes that his axiomatic construction works equally well over a σ-
algebra, but only produces finitely additive probabilities. Arrow (1970) enriches the Savage
axioms so as to further derive the σ-additivity of probability measures. See also Kopylov
(2010). Epstein and Zhang (2001) construct a theory of “probabilistic sophistication” on
“λ-systems”. Finally, Kopylov (2007) provides both SEU maximization and probabilistic
sophistication on the weaker structure of so-called mosaics, which include Boolean algebras.
The SEU representation in Theorem 2 has similarities with previous SEU representa-
tions using “subjective state spaces”. For example, Stinchcombe (1997, §7) also constructs
16Aliev and Huseynov (2014) provide another model of “vague” or “imprecise” information by repre-
senting events in terms of fuzzy subsets of the state space.
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an SEU representation based on Stone spaces. However, he works in a very different
framework, and his results are unrelated to ours. Jaffray and Wakker (1993) and Mukerji
(1997) introduce “two-tiered” state spaces; in the model of Jaffray and Wakker, the agent
has probabilistic beliefs about one tier and total ignorance about the other, whereas in
Mukerji’s model, one tier represents the agent’s internal epistemic state and the other tier
represents objectively payoff-relevant information. Finally, there is an interesting contrast
between Theorem 2 and the model of Lipman (1999). In Lipman’s model, as in ours, the
agent is equipped with a mental vocabulary of propositions, each of which can be either
true or false. In Lipman’s model, the “true” state space is the set of all logically consistent
assignments of truth-values to these propositions. But the agent’s subjective state space
also includes some logically inconsistent truth-value assignments; these so-called “impossi-
ble possible worlds” reflect her lack of logical omniscience. In our model, by contrast, S is
a set of consistent but logically incomplete truth-value assignments, whereas S∗ is the set
of all consistent and complete assignments.
This paper is the first of three on similar themes. In Pivato and Vergopoulos (2018a),
we specialize the model of the present paper to the case when B = R(S) and D =
R(X ), and obtain SEU representations in terms of residual charges, Borel measures and
compactifications of the state space. These results yield deeper insights into the way the
agent deals with her imperfect perception, using a probabilistic device we call a liminal
structure. Finally, in Pivato and Vergopoulos (2018b), we allow for piecewise continuous
acts (i.e. functions which are continuous on each cell of some regular partition of the state
space) and extend the SEU representations accordingly.
Appendices
Appendix A contains the proof of Theorem 1. Appendix B contains the proofs of all other
results in the paper, including Theorems 2, 3 and 4. The proofs in the appendices draw
heavily on results from a companion paper, which studies credences and their representa-
tions by classical probability measures (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c). We will refer to
results in the companion paper with the prefix “PV”. Thus, “Theorem PV-4.3” should be
read as, “Theorem 4.3 from Pivato and Vergopoulos (2018c).”
A Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 has two preliminary stages. First, Proposition A3 uses (Rch) and
axioms (Sep), (TC), (CCP), (Dom), (CEq) and (M) to construct a credence µ on B and a
D-measurable utility function u using a theorem of Wakker (1988) for continuous additive
representations. Second, Proposition A6 shows that the expected utility of any act, with
respect to µ and u, equals the utility of any certainty equivalent of this act. The rest of
the appendix uses these findings to construct the SEU representations and establishes the
necessity of the axioms, as well as the uniqueness of the representation. Throughout this
appendix, we maintain the following standing assumptions:
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S and X are topological spaces, with X connected. B ⊆ R(S) and D ⊆ R(X )
are nontrivial Boolean subalgebras, A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D), and {B}B∈B is a
conditional preference structure on A that satisfies (Rch).
Lemma A1 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (M), (Dom) and (CEq). Let B ∈ B.
Define the function KB : X−→A(B) by KB(x) := κxB for all x ∈ X . Then KB is continuous
relative to the B-order topology on A(B).
Proof. For any α, γ ∈ A(B), let (α, γ)B := {β ∈ A(B); α ≺B β ≺B γ}. This collection of
sets (for all α, γ ∈ A(B)) forms a base for the B-order topology on A(B). So it suffices
to show that K−1B [(α, γ)B ] is open in X , for all α, β ∈ A(B).
Axiom (CEq) says there exist x, z ∈ X such that α ≈B κxB and γ ≈B κzB. Define
(x, z)xp := {y ∈ X ; x ≺xp y ≺xp z}. Since axiom (M) implies axiom (C), the latter is
an open subset of X . Now, for any y ∈ X , we have(






















y ∈ (x, z)xp
)
.
Here, (∗) is because α ≈B κxB and γ ≈B κzB, while (†) is by axiom (Dom) and its
contrapositive. Thus, we see that K−1B [(α, γ)B ] = (x, z)xp , which is an open subset of
X . Since this holds for all α, γ ∈ A(B), we conclude that KB is continuous. 2
It will be convenient to use the following equivalent formulation of axiom (CCP).
(PC′) Let B = D∨E as in axiom (Sep). Let O ⊆ A(B) be open in the B-order topology,
and let α ∈ O. Then there exist sets OD ⊆ A(D) and OE ⊆ A(E) which are open in
the D-order topology and E -order topology, with αD ∈ OD and αE ∈ OE , such
that, for any β ∈ A(B), if βD ∈ OD and βE ∈ OE , then β ∈ O.
Lemma A2 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (CCP), (M), (Dom) and (CEq). Consider
a B-partition P = {E1, . . . , EN} of S with N ≥ 2. There exists a mapping ΦP : XN−→A
that is continuous with respect to the product topology on XN and the S-order topology
on A and satisfies ΦP(x)En ≈En κxnEn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and any x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ XN .
Proof. Let x := (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ XN . Define α1 := κx1E1 , an element of A(E1). Condition
(Rch) yields α2 ∈ A(E1 ∨ E2) such that α2E1 = κx1E1 and α2E2 ≈E2 κx2E2 . Next, (Rch) yields
α3 ∈ A(E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3) such that α3E1∨E2 = α2 and α3E3 ≈E3 κx3E3 . In particular, this means
that α3En ≈En κxnEn for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Inductively, let M ∈ [4 . . . N ], and suppose we have some αM−1 ∈ A(E1 ∨ · · · ∨ EM−1)
such that αM−1Em ≈Em κxmEm for all m ∈ [1 . . .M). (Rch) yields αM ∈ A(E1 ∨ · · · ∨ EM)
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such that αME1∨···∨EM−1 = α
M−1 and αMEM ≈EM κxMEM . In particular, this means that
αMEm ≈Em κxmEm for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ].
Setting M = N in this construction, we obtain some αN such that αNEn ≈En κxnEn for
all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Now define ΦP(x) := αN . To prove the continuity of ΦP, we need a
preliminary result, which extends axiom (CCP).
Claim 1: Let O ⊆ A be open in the S-order topology, and let α ∈ O. Then for all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], there is a set On ⊆ A(En) which is open in the En-order topology, with
αEn ∈ On, such that, for any β ∈ A, if βEn ∈ On for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], then β ∈ O.
Proof. Let D1 := E2 ∨ · · · ∨ EN . Thus, B := E1 ∨ D1. Setting D := D1 and E := E1
in axiom (PC′), we obtain some O1 ⊆ A(E1) and Q1 ⊆ A(D1) with αE1 ∈ O1 and
αD1 ∈ Q1, such that, for any β ∈ A(B), if βE1 ∈ O1 and βD1 ∈ Q1 then β ∈ O.
Now let D2 := E3 ∨ · · · ∨ EN . Thus, D1 := E2 ∨ D2. Setting D := D2 and E := E2
in axiom (PC′), we obtain some O2 ⊆ A(E2) and Q2 ⊆ A(D2) with αE2 ∈ O2 and
αD2 ∈ Q2, such that, for any β ∈ A(D1), if βE2 ∈ O2 and βD2 ∈ Q2 then β ∈ Q1. In
particular, this means that, for any β ∈ A(G), if βE1 ∈ O1, βE2 ∈ O2 and βD2 ∈ Q2,
then β ∈ O.
Inductively, let M ∈ [3 . . . N), let DM−1 := EM ∨ · · · ∨ EN , and suppose that, for
all m ∈ [1 . . .M), we have constructed Om ⊆ A(Em) (open in the Em-topology) with
αEm ∈ Om, along with some QM−1 ⊆ A(DM−1) (open in the DM−1-topology) with
αDM−1 ∈ QM−1, such that, for any β ∈ A(G), if βEm ∈ Om for all m ∈ [1 . . .M) and
βDM−1 ∈ QM−1, then β ∈ O. Now letDM := EM+1∨· · ·∨EN . Thus, DM−1 := EM∨DM .
Setting D := DM and E := EM in axiom (PC′), we obtain some OM ⊆ A(EM) and
QM ⊆ A(DM) with αEM ∈ OM and αDM ∈ QM , such that, for any β ∈ A(DM−1), if
βEM ∈ OM and βDM ∈ QM then β ∈ QM−1. In particular, this means that, for any
β ∈ A(G), if βEm ∈ Om for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ] and βDM ∈ QM , then β ∈ O.
Suppose M = N − 1 in the previous paragraph. Then DM = EN . Thus, if we define
ON := QN−1, then we have obtained sets O1, . . . ,ON satisfying the claim. 3 Claim 1
It remains to show that ΦP is continuous with respect to the product topology on XN
and the S-order topology on A. To see this, let O ⊆ A be open in the S-order
topology. It is sufficient to show that U := Φ−1P (O) is open in the product topology on
XN . To do this, let x ∈ U ; we will construct an open neighbourhood around x inside U .
Let α := ΦP(x) ∈ A. Then, α ∈ O. For any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let On ⊆ A(En) be the
open subset in the En-order topology obtained in Claim 1, and define Vn := K−1En (On).
By Lemma A1, each KEn is a continuous function from X to A(En). So Vn is an open
subset of X for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Define V := V1 × . . .× VN ; then V is an open subset
of XN in the product topology.
Claim 2: x ∈ V .
Proof. Any open set in an order topology is a union of order intervals, and any order
interval is a union of indifference classes (because if an order interval contains some
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element γ, then it also contains all other elements which are indifferent to γ). Thus,
any open set is a union of indiffererence classes.
Now fix n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. By Claim 1, we have αEn ∈ On. Moreover, by the definition
of α and the construction of ΦP, we have αEn = ΦP(x)En ≈En κxnEn . By the remark
in the previous paragraph, and since On is open in the En-order topology, we obtain
κxnEn ∈ On. Then, xn ∈ Vn. Since this holds for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we obtain x ∈V1 × . . .× VN = V . 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: V ⊆ U .
Proof. Let y = (y1, . . . , yN) ∈ V and define β = ΦP(y) ∈ A. Fix n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then
yn ∈ Vn, so by definition of Vn, we have κynEn ∈ On. By the construction of ΦP, we have
βEn = ΦP(y)En ≈En κ
yn
En . Since On is open in the En-order topology and κynEn ∈ On,
On must also contain any act that is indifferent to κynEn . Thus, βEn ∈ On. This holds
for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then, by Claim 1, β ∈ O. Finally, y ∈ Φ−1P (O) = U . 3 Claim 3
Thus, V is an open neighbourhood around x (in the product topology), which is contained
in U . We can construct such a neighbourhood around any x ∈ U . Thus, U is open in
the product topology. Hence ΦP is continuous, as claimed. 2
Consider any regular partition P = (B1, . . . ,BN) of S with N ≥ 2. Let ΦP be the mapping
from Lemma A2. We then define a preference order P on XN in the following way: For








Proposition A3 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (Sep), (M), (TC), (CCP), (Dom) and
(CEq). Then, there exists a credence µ on B with full support and a continuous function













where P is defined by formula (A1). Moreover, µ is unique, and u is unique up to positive
affine transformation. Finally, u is an ordinal utility function for xp and is D-measurable.
Proof. Fix a B-partition P = (B1, . . . ,BN) of S with N ≥ 2 (such a partition exists because
B is nontrivial). Define P on XN according to formula (A1).
Claim 1: P is continuous with respect to the product topology on XN .
Proof. Fix y ∈ XN and define β := ΦP(y) ∈ A. Let O = {α ∈ A, α S β}; this is an
open set in the S-order topology on A. Then, by Lemma A2, U := Φ−1P (O) is an















where (∗) is by formula (A1) and (†) is by the definition of U . Thus, the strict upper
contour set of P at y is equal to U and, therefore, an open set in the product topology
on XN . A similar proof works for strict lower contour sets. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: P satisfies Cardinal Coordinate Independence: For all n,m ∈ [1 . . . N ],
all x,y,v,w ∈ XN and all a, b, c, d ∈ X , if anx−n P bny−n, cnx−n P dny−n and
amv−m P bmw−m, then cmv−m P dmw−m.
Proof. Define (aBnα), (bBnβ), (cBnα), (dBnβ) ∈ A by (aBnα) := ΦP(anx−n), (bBnβ) :=
ΦP(bny−n), (cBnα) := ΦP(cnx−n) and (dBnβ) := ΦP(dny−n). Then, by the definition
(A1) of P, we have (aBnα) S (bBnβ) and (cBnα) S (dBnβ). Moreover, by the def-
inition of ΦP, we have (aBnα)Bn ≈Bn κaBn , (bBnβ)Bn ≈Bn κbBn , (cBnα)Bn ≈Bn κcBn and
(dBnβ)Bn ≈Bn κdBn . Meanwhile, (aBnα)Bl ≈Bl (cBnα)Bl and (bBnβ)Bl ≈Bl (dBnβ)Bl
for all l ∈ [1 . . . N ] with l 6= n. So if we set Q := ¬Bn, then by (Sep) we obtain
(aBnα)Q ≈Q (cBnα)Q and (bBnβ)Q ≈Q (dBnβ)Q. This shows that (a Bn; b)  (c Bn; d).
Meanwhile, define (aBmγ), (bBmδ), (cBmγ), (dBmδ) ∈ A by (aBmγ) := ΦP(amv−m),
(bBmδ) := ΦP(bmw−m), (cBmγ) := ΦP(cmv−m) and (dBmδ) := ΦP(dmw−m). Pro-
ceeding as above, we obtain (aBmγ) S (bBmδ) with (aBmγ)Bm ≈Bm κaBm , (bBmδ)Bm
≈Bm κbBm , (cBmγ)Bm ≈Bm κcBm and (dBmδ)Bm ≈Bm κdBm . Moreover, set Q′ := ¬Bm.
Then we also have (aBmγ)Q′ ≈Q′ (cBmγ)Q′ and (bBmδ)Q′ ≈Q′ (dBmδ)Q′ . Now, if it
is not the case that cmv−m P dmw−m, then (A1) implies that it is also not the case
that (cBmγ) S (dBmδ). Thus, (cBmγ) ≺S (dBmδ) (because S is a complete order).
But this means that (a
Bm
; b) ≺ (c Bm; d), which contradicts (TC). Thus, we must have
cmv−m P dmw−m, as claimed. 3 Claim 2
By Claims 1 and 2, and the connectedness of X , the assumptions of Wakker’s (1988)
Theorem 6.2 are satisfied. So there exist a continuous function uP : X−→R and a














Moreover, the probability vector is unique, and the function is unique up to positive
affine transformation.
By the nontriviality of S and axiom (Dom), there exist l, o ∈ X with l xp o. Then,
still by (Dom), κlB B κoB for any B ∈ B. Fix n ∈ [1 . . . N ], and let x,y ∈ XN be
such that xn = l, yn = o, and xm = ym = o for any m ∈ [1 . . . N ] \ {n}. Then,
ΦP(x)Bm ≈Bm κoBm ≈Bm ΦP(y)Bm for anym ∈ [1 . . . N ]\{n}. LetQ = ¬Bn. By iterative
applications of (Sep), we have ΦP(x)Q ≈Q ΦP(y)Q. Moreover, we have ΦP(x)Bn ≈Bn
κlBn Bn κoBn ≈Bn ΦP(y)Bn Another application of (Sep) yields ΦP(x) Bn ΦP(y) and,
by formula (A1), x P y. Then, from (A2) and the definition of x and y, we get
µP(Bn) · [uP(l)− uP(o)] > 0.
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This inequality first shows that µP(Bn) > 0, and this holds for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. It also
shows uP(l) > uP(o). Thus, we obtain a unique function uP providing a representation
as in formula (A3) and satisfying uP(l) = 1 and uP(o) = 0. From now on, we assume
that the functions uP are normalized in this way.
Claim 3: For any two B-partitions P and Q of S, each with at least two cells,
uP = uQ. Moreover, if B ∈ B is a cell in each of P and Q, then µP(B) = µQ(B).
Proof. LetP = {P1, . . . ,PN} with Pn ∈ B for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], and letQ = (Q1, . . . ,QM)
with Qm ∈ B for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ]. Consider first the case where Q refines P —that
is, for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ], there is some n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that Qm ⊆ Pn. For all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Mn ⊆ [1 . . .M ] be the set of m ∈ [1 . . .M ] such that Qm ⊆ Pn.
Then, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], the subcollection {Qm, m ∈ Mn} is a B-partition of Pn.





Then, the collection (p1, . . . , pN) is a probability vector on [1 . . . N ]. Moreover, for any
x ∈ XN , define x′ ∈ XM by setting
x′m = xn, for all m ∈Mn and n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. (A5)
Note that by (Sep) we have the following indifference for any x ∈ XN :
ΦP(x) ≈S ΦQ(x′) (A6)




























































Here, both (a) are by equation (A1), (b) is by equation (A6), (c) is by equation (A3),
(d) by equation (A5), and (e) is by equation (A4). Thus, uQ and (p1, . . . , pN) provide
a representation of P as in equation (A3). By uniqueness, we obtain uP = uQ.






Now, if P and Q have a common cell B ∈ B, then B = Pn = Qm for some n ∈ [1 . . . N ]
and m ∈ [1 . . .M ] such that Mn = {m}. Then, equation (A7) yields µP(B) = µQ(B).
Now consider the general case, where neither P nor Q refines the other. Let P⊗Q :=
{P ∩Q; P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q}. Then P⊗Q is a B-partition which refines both P and
Q. Now apply to the previous argument to P and P⊗Q on the one hand, and to Q
and P⊗Q on the other hand to conclude. 3 Claim 3
Now, we define a set function µ : B−→[0, 1] by setting µ(S) = 1, µ(∅) = 0 and, for
any B ∈ B, µ(B) = µP(B) where P = {B,¬B}. Note that, for any nonempty B ∈ B,
µ(B) > 0 since we have already proved that µP(B) > 0.
Claim 4: µ is a credence on B with full support.
Proof. Consider a collection {P1, . . . ,PN} of pairwise disjoint regular subsets in B, and
let B be its join. Consider first the case where B = S, and set P = {P1, . . . ,PN}.






µP(Pn) (†) 1. (A8)
Here (∗) is by Claim 3, and (†) is because µP is a probability distribution. Now, if
B 6= S, set PN+1 := ¬B. Consider Q = {P1, . . . ,PN ,PN+1} and Q′ = {B,PN+1}, two
B-partitions of S. We have
N∑
n=1
µ(Pn) (a) 1− µQ(PN+1) (b) 1− µQ′(PN+1) (c) µQ′(B) (d) µ(B). (A9)
Here, both (a) and (c) are by suitable versions of equation (A8) while both (b) and
(d) are by Claim 3. Thus, µ is a credence. Finally, µ is fully supported since it has
positive values at any nonempty regular subset in B. 3 Claim 4
Set u := uQ for some B-partition Q of S with at least two cells. For any B-partition
P = {P1, . . . ,PN} of S with N ≥ 2, Claim 3 yields u = uP and µP(Pn) = µ(Pn) for all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. This, together with equation (A3), completes the proof of formula (A2).
Claim 5: u is an ordinal utility function for xp.
Proof. Fix x, y ∈ X . Since B is nondegenerate, there exists a B-partition P =
{B1, . . . ,BN} of S with N ≥ 2. Let x,y ∈ XN be defined by xn := x and yn := y for
































where (a) is by the definition of xp, (b) is because by inductive applications of (Sep)
and because ΦP(x)Bn ≈Bn κxBn and ΦP(y)Bn ≈Bn κyBn , for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Mean-
while, (c) is by formula (A2). 3 Claim 5
Claim 6: u is D-measurable.
Proof. Fix an open interval O ⊆ R. We must show that u−1(O) ∈ D.
First, suppose O = (q,∞) for some q ∈ R. If u(x) < q for all x ∈ X , then
u−1(q,∞) = ∅ ∈ D. On the other hand, if u(x) > q for all x ∈ X , then u−1(q,∞) =
X ∈ D. If neither of these cases holds, then there must exist x, z ∈ X with u(x) ≤
q ≤ u(z). Since u is continuous and X is connected, the Intermediate Value Theorem
yields some y ∈ X such that u(y) = q. But then u−1(q,∞) = {z ∈ X ; z xp y},
because, by Claim 5 , u is an ordinal utility representation for xp. Thus, u−1(q,∞)
is an open upper contour set of xp, so u−1(q,∞) ∈ D, by axiom (M).
The same argument works if O = (−∞, r) for some r ∈ R. Finally, if O = (q, r),
then O = (−∞, r)∩ (q,∞), so u−1(O) = u−1(−∞, r)∩ u−1(q,∞) is an intersection of
two elements of D, and thus, an element of D.
Finally, let B be an arbitrary basic subset of R. Then B := (a1, b1) unionsq (a2, b2) unionsq
· · · unionsq (aN , bN) for some −∞ ≤ a1 < b1 < a2 < b2 < · · · < aN < bN ≤ ∞. For all














































, but x 6∈ Dn = int[clos(Dn)] for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Thus, if U is any open neighbourhood around x, then U overlaps ⋃Nn=1 clos(Dn)
but U 6⊆ clos(Dn) for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]; hence there must be at least two distinct







Then  > 0 because bn < an+1 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], by hypothesis. Let r := u(x),
and let V := (r − , r + ). Then V is an open neighbourhood around r. Let
U := u−1(V); then U is an open neighbourhood around x (because u is continuous),
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so by the previous paragraph there exist distinct n < m ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that
U ∩ clos(Dn) 6= ∅ and U ∩ clos(Dm) 6= ∅. Now, u(U) = V (by definition of U),
while u[clos(Dn)] ⊆ clos(an, bn) = [an, bn] and u[clos(Dm)] ⊆ clos(am, bm) = [am, bm]
(because u is continuous). Thus, we must have V ∩ [an, bn] 6= ∅ and V ∩ [am, bm] 6= ∅.
But this is impossible, because V is an interval of length 2 ≤ (am − bn)/2, by
construction.
To avoid the contradiction, we must have x ∈ Dn for some n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. This























Thus, it is an element of D, as desired. 3 Claim 6
This completes the proof. 2
Our SEU representation requires one more technical preliminary.
Proposition A4 (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2018c, Theorem 4.3) Let S be any topological
space, let B be any Boolean subalgebra of R(S), and let µ be a credence with full support
on B. There exists a unique, strictly monotonic conditional expectation system E that is
compatible with µ.
Lemma A5 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axiom (Sep). For any B ∈ B, consider a B-
partition P = {B1, . . . ,BN} of B. For any α, β ∈ A(B), if αBn Bn βBn for any n ∈
[1 . . . N ], then α B β.
Proof. We proceed by induction. Consider first a subset B ∈ B and a two-cell partition
P = {B1,B2} of B. Let α, β ∈ A(B) be such that αB1 B1 βB1 and αB2 B2 βB2 .
By (Rch), there exists γ ∈ A(B) such that γB1 ≈B1 αB1 and γB2 ≈B2 βB2 . Then, we
have αB1 ≈B1 γB1 and αB2 B2 γB2 . By (Sep), we obtain α B γ. Similarly, we have
γB1 B1 βB1 and γB2 ≈B2 βB2 . Still by (Sep), we obtain γ B β. Since α B γ and
γ B β, we finally obtain α B β as desired.
Consider now a subset B ∈ B and an N -cell partition P = {B1, . . . ,BN} of B with
N ≥ 2. Let α, β ∈ A(B) be such that αBn Bn βBn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Let
Q = B1 ∨ . . . ∨ BN1 . By induction, we have αQ Q βQ. But since {Q,BN} is a two-
cell partition of B, and since we have αQ Q βQ and αBN BN βBN , the previous
paragraph yields α B β as desired. 2
Proposition A6 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (Sep), (M), (TC), (CCP), (Dom)
and (CEq). Let µ be the credence and u be the utility function from Proposition A3. Let
{EB}B∈B be the unique µ-compatible conditional expectation system from Proposition A4.
Then, for any B ∈ B, α ∈ A(B) and x ∈ X such that α ≈B κxB, we have
EB [u ◦ α] = u(x). (A10)
34
Proof. For any B ∈ B, and any g ∈ GB(B), we define E˜B[g] := µ[B]EB[g]. Recall that
EB[1] = 1. Thus, E˜B[1] = µ[B]. Thus, for any r ∈ R, the linearity of EB implies
E˜B[r1] = r µ[B]. (A11)
Let B ∈ B and α ∈ A(B). Consider first the case where u ◦ α is constant over B. Then
there exists y ∈ X such that u ◦ α(s) = u(y) for any s ∈ B. Then EB [u ◦ α] = u(y)
by the linearity of EB. On the other hand, by Proposition A3, u is an ordinal utility
function for xp. Therefore, α(s) ≈xp y for any s ∈ B. By (Dom), we obtain α ≈B κyB
and thus, κxB ≈B κyB by transitivity. Still by (Dom) we have x ≈xp y. Thus, u(x) = u(y),
because u is an ordinal utility function for xp. This shows EB [u ◦ α] = u(x), as desired.
Consider now the case where u◦α takes at least two different values over B. Let β ∈ A
be such that βB = α. Let K := clos[β(S)] (i.e. the closure of the image set β(S) in X );
then K is compact, because β ∈ Cb(S,B;X ;D). Recall that u : X−→R is continuous,
by Proposition A3. Thus, u is bounded when restricted to K. If we define U := u◦β(S),
then U is a bounded subset of R —say, U ⊆ [−M,M ] for some M ∈ N.
Let  > 0. Let N ∈ N be large enough that 1
N
< . For all n ∈ [−MN . . .MN),
let Cn := (u ◦ β)−1[ nN , n+1N ]. Recall that u : X−→R is D-measurable by Proposition A3,
while β is (B,D)-comeasurable, by the definition of A. Thus, u ◦ β is B-comeasurable,
by Proposition PV-5.4(a). Thus if Bn := int(Cn) ∩ B, then Bn is a (possibly empty)
element of B. Let P−MN = B−MN and, for any m ∈ (−MN . . .MN), define Pm :=
Bm ∩ (¬Bm−1). Then P−MN , . . . ,PMN−1 are disjoint (possibly empty) elements of B.
Let N := {n ∈ [−NM . . .NM); Pn 6= ∅}. Finally, define P := {Pn}n∈N ; then P is a
B-partition of B. Since u ◦ α takes at least two different values over B, we can take N
to be large enough to make sure that P has at least two cells.
Claim 1: For any n ∈ N , there exist values xn, yn ∈ X such that
n
N
≤ u(xn) ≤ u ◦ α(p) ≤ u(yn) ≤ n+ 1
N
, (A12)
for all p ∈ Pn.
Proof. Recall that K := clos[β(S)] is a compact subset of X . Thus, its image u(K) is a
compact subset of R, because u is continuous. Thus, the set Wn := u(K) ∩ [ nN , n+1N ]
is compact. Thus, wn := min(Wn) and wn := max(Wn) are well-defined. Let xn ∈
u−1{wn} and let yn ∈ u−1{wn}. Thus, u(xn) = wn ≥ nN , while u(yn) = wn ≤ n+1N ,
For any p ∈ Pn, we have α(p) = β(p) and β(p) ∈ K, and also u ◦ α(p) ∈ [ nN , n+1N ]
by definition of Pn; thus, u ◦ α(p) ∈ Wn. Thus, wn ≤ u ◦ α(p) ≤ wn, i.e. u(xn) ≤
u ◦ α(p) ≤ u(yn), as claimed. 3 Claim 1








Claim 2: u ≤ E˜B [u ◦ α] ≤ u
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Proof. Fix n ∈ N . For all p ∈ Pn, formula (A12) says u(xn) ≤ u ◦ α(p) ≤ u(yn), and
thus,
µ[Pn] · u(xn) (∗) E˜Pn [u(xn) 1] ≤
(†)
E˜Pn [u ◦ α]
≤
(†)
E˜Pn [u(yn) 1] (∗) µ[Pn] · u(yn). (A13)
Here, both (∗) are by equation (A11), and both (†) are by inequality (A12) and the
monotonicity of the conditional expectation operator EB. Summing the versions of




µ(Pn) · u(xn) ≤
∑
n∈N
E˜Pn [u ◦ α] ≤
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(yn) = u.
The result then follows by noting that the middle term in this inequality is equal to
E˜B [u ◦ α] thanks to equation (6) 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: u ≤ µ(B) · u(x) ≤ u.
Proof. Fix o ∈ X . Define a′,b′, c′ ∈ XN in the following way:
For any n ∈ N , a′n := xn, b′n := x and c′n := yn.
Consider the B-partition Q = {¬B} ∪ {Pn, n ∈ N} made of M := 1 + |N | cells (
so M ≥ 2). Define a,b, c ∈ XM by setting a := (a′, o), b := (b′, o) and c := (c′, o).
Finally, let ΦQ be the mapping constructed in Lemma A2.
Now, u is an ordinal utility function for xp, by Proposition A3. Thus, for all n ∈ N
and p ∈ Pn, formula (A12) implies that xn xp αPn(p) xp yn. Thus, axiom (Dom)
implies that
κxnPn Pn αPn Pn κynPn . (A14)
Given the defining properties of the mapping ΦQ, formula (A14) then implies that
ΦQ(a)Pn Pn αPn Pn ΦQ(c)Pn . (A15)
Since formula (A15) holds for every n ∈ N , Lemma A5 further yields
ΦQ(a)B B α B ΦQ(c)B. (A16)
Meanwhile, we have ΦQ(b)Pn ≈Pn κxPn for every n ∈ N . By iterative applications of
(Sep), we obtain ΦQ(b)B ≈B κxB. But by assumption α ≈B κxB. Thus, ΦQ(b)B ≈B α,
by transitivity. Formula (A16) then gives
ΦQ(a)B B ΦQ(b)B B ΦQ(c)B. (A17)
Moreover, by construction, we have ΦQ(a)Q ≈Q ΦQ(b)Q ≈Q ΦQ(c)Q ≈Q κoQ where
Q = ¬B. Given this fact and formula (A17), axiom (Sep) implies
ΦQ(a) S ΦQ(b) S ΦQ(c). (A18)
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By the definition of Q in formula (A1) and its representation obtained in Proposition
A3, formula (A18) implies∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(an) + µ(Q) · u(o) ≤
∑
n∈N




µ(Pn) · u(cn) + µ(Q) · u(o),




µ(Pn) · u(xn) ≤ µ(B) · u(x) ≤
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(xn) = u.
This completes the proof of the claim. 3 Claim 3
Finally, we obtain















Here, (a) is by Claims 2 and 3, (b) is by the definition of u and u, (c) is inequality
(A12), because 1/N <  by definition, and (d) is because µ is a credence on B and P is
a B-partition of B. This argument works for all  > 0. Letting →0, we conclude that
E˜B[u ◦ α] = µ(B) · u(x). Last, since µ‘ has full support, we obtain EB[u ◦ α] = u(x). 2
Finally, we come to the proof of the main result.
Proof of Theorem 1.
SEU representation. Let u : X−→R be the normalized ex post utility function and
let µ be the credence with full support from Proposition A3. Let {EB}B∈B be the unique
µ-compatible conditional expectation system from Proposition A4.
For any B ∈ B and α, β ∈ A(B), axiom (CEq) yields x, y ∈ X such that α ≈B κxB and




















EB[u ◦ α] ≥ EB[u ◦ β].
)
Here, (∗) is by axiom (Dom), (†) is because u is an ordinal utility function for xp by
Proposition A3, and () is by Proposition A6. This equivalence establishes the SEU
representation. It remains to show that the representation is unique and demonstrate
the necessity of the axioms.
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Uniqueness. Let u, u′ : X−→R be two D-measurable (hence continuous) functions, and
let E := {EB}R∈B and E′ := {E′B}R∈B be two conditional expectation systems. Let µ and
µ′ be two credences on B with which E and E′ are respectively compatible. Suppose that
(u, µ) and (u′, µ′) are both SEU representations for the conditional preference structure
{B}B∈B. We must show that µ = µ′ and u is a positive affine transformation of u′.
Let E = {E1, . . . , EN} be a B-partition of S, with N ≥ 2 (such a partition exists
because B is nontrivial). For any x ∈ XN , Lemma A2 yields an act αx ∈ A such that
αxBn ≈Bn κxnEn for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then we have
ES [u ◦ αx] (∗)
N∑
n=1








Here, (∗) is by equation (6), while (†) is by the SEU representation and the fact that
αxBn ≈Bn κxnBn for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Define E as in equation (A1). By equation (A19),





























Now, by the uniqueness part of Proposition A3, we obtain that µ and µ′ are equal to
each other, and that u and u′ are positive affine transformation of each other.
Necessity of the axioms. Assume that {B}B∈B satisfies condition (Rch) and has an
SEU representation in the sense of Theorem 1 with respect to a D-measurable (hence
continuous) utility function u and a credence µ with full support. Let E := {EB}B∈B be
the unique, strictly monotonic conditional expectation system defined by µ via Propo-
sition A4. Axiom (Dom) is a simple consequence of the strict monotonicity of each
expectation functional in E. Axiom (Sep) follows from the fact that E satisfies Equation
(6). The proofs of the other axioms are somewhat more involved.
Axiom (TC): Fix two disjoint subsets B1,B2 ∈ B, and let Q1 = ¬B1 and Q2 = ¬B2. Fix
x, y, v, w ∈ X . By contradiction, assume that (x B1; y)  (v B1; w) but (x B2; y) ≺ (v B2;
w). Then, since (x
B1
; y)  (v B1; w), there exist α, β ∈ A(Q1), an (x, α)-bet (xB1α) ∈ A,
a (y, β)-bet (yB1β) ∈ A, a (v, α)-bet (vB1α) ∈ A and a (w, β)-bet (wB1β) ∈ A such that
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(xB1α) S (yB1β) while (vB1α) S (wB1β). We now show that u(x)−u(y) ≤ u(v)−u(w).










EQ1 [u ◦ (yB1β)]− EQ1 [u ◦ (xB1α)]
)
. (A20)
Here, (∗) is by formula (B1) in the definition of bets, equation (6) and the SEU repre-
sentation. Meanwhile, (†) is because ES [u ◦ (xB1α)] ≤ ES [u ◦ (yB1β)] because (xB1α) S







EQ1 [u ◦ (wB1β)]− EQ1 [u ◦ (vB1α)]
)
. (A21)
Meanwhile, by formula (B2) in the definition of bets and the SEU representation, we
have EQ1 [u◦ (xB1α)] = EQ1 [u◦ (vB1α)] and EQ1 [u◦ (yB1β)] = EQ1 [u◦ (wB1β)]. Combining
inequalities (A20) and (A21) and using the fact that µ has full support, we obtain
u(x)− u(y) ≤ u(v)− u(w). (A22)
Now, since (x
B2
; y) ≺ (v B2; w), there exist γ, δ ∈ A(Q2), an (x, γ)-bet (xB2γ) ∈ A,
a (y, δ)-bet (yB2δ) ∈ A, a (v, γ)-bet (vB2γ) ∈ A and a (w, δ)-bet (wB2δ) ∈ A such that













EQ2 [u ◦ (wB2δ)]− EQ2 [u ◦ (vB2γ)]
)
, (A23)
where (∗) is obtained like inequality (A20), while (†) is by formula (B2) in the definition







EQ2 [u ◦ (wB2δ)]− EQ2 [u ◦ (vB2γ)]
)
. (A24)
Finally, applying equation (6) and the SEU representation to inequality (A24), we obtain
(vB2γ) S (wB2δ). But this contradicts the fact that (vB2γ) ≺S (wB2δ) .
Axioms (C) and (M): Let x ∈ X . Let (x,→)xp := {y ∈ X ; y xp x} and let
(←, x)xp := {y ∈ X ; y ≺xp x}. To verify axiom (C), we must show that these sets
are open in X . To verify axiom (M), we must show that they are elements of D. To
verify both, let r := u(x), and observe that (x,→)xp = u−1(r,∞) and (←, x)xp =
u−1(−∞, r), because u is an ordinal utility representation for xp. Since u is continuous,
these preimage sets are open in X . Since u is D-measurable, these preimage sets are
elements of D.
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Axiom (CEq): Let B ∈ B and let α ∈ A(B). Then α = α′B for some α′ ∈ A.
Claim 1: clos[α′(S)] has a xp-maximal element and a xp-minimal element.17
Proof. (By contradiction) Suppose clos[α′(S)] had no xp-maximal element. Thus, for
any x ∈ clos[α′(S)], there exists some y ∈ clos[α′(S)] with y xp x. In other words,
x ∈ (←, y)xp . Thus, the collection {(←, y)xp ; y ∈ clos[α′(S)]} is an open cover for
clos[α′(S)].
However, α′ ∈ Cb(S,X ), so its image α′(S) is relatively compact; hence clos[α′(S)]
is compact. Thus, this open cover has a finite subcover; in other words, there ex-
ists some y1, . . . , yN ∈ clos[α′(S)] such that clos[α′(S)] is covered by the collection
{(←, yn)xp}Nn=1. Now, let y := maxxp{y1, . . . , yN} (this maximum exists because the
set is finite). Then y ∈ clos[α′(S)], and (←, yn)xp ⊆ (←, y)xp for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Thus, clos[α′(S)] ⊆ (←, y)xp . But clearly, y 6∈ (←, y)xp , whereas y ∈ clos[α′(S)].
Contradiction.
To avoid the contradiction, clos[α′(S)] must have a xp-maximal element. The proof
for xp-minimal elements is analogous. 3 Claim 1
Let x be a xp-minimal element of clos[α′(S)], and let z be a xp-maximal element of
clos[α′(S)]; these exist by Claim 1. Then x xp α(b) xp z for all b ∈ B. Thus, axiom
(Dom) implies that κxB B α B κzB. Thus,
u(x) = EB[u ◦ κxB] ≤
(∗)
EB[u ◦ α] ≤
(∗)
EB[u ◦ κzB] = u(z),
where both (∗) are because of the assumed SEU representation. However, u : X−→R
is continuous, and X is connected. Thus, the Intermediate Value Theorem yields some
y ∈ X such that u(y) = EB[u ◦ α]. Thus, EB[u ◦ κyB] = EB[u ◦ α]. But then the assumed
SEU representation yields κyB ≈B α, as desired.
Axiom (CCP): Let D ∈ B and E ∈ B be disjoint, and let G := D ∨ E . Let O ⊆ A(G)
be open in the G-order topology, and let β ∈ O. Thus, there exist some α, γ ∈ A(G)
such that α ≺G β ≺G γ, and O contains the order-interval (α, γ)G . Let a := EG[u ◦ α],
b := EG[u ◦ β], and c := EG[u ◦ γ]; then a < b < c. Let  := min{b − a, c − b}. Then
 > 0.
Claim 2: There exist a subset OD ⊆ A(D), open in the D-order topology, such that
βD ∈ OD, and such that |ED[u ◦ ωD]− ED[u ◦ βD]| <  for all ωD ∈ OD.
Proof. (Case 1) First, suppose that βD is neither D-maximal nor D-minimal in
A(D). Then there exists some φD, ψD ∈ A(D) such that φD ≺D βD ≺D ψD. Now,
φD := φ′D and ψD := ψ
′
D for some φ, ψ ∈ A. Let w be a xp-minimal element of
clos[φ′(S)], and let z be a xp-maximal element of clos[ψ′(S)]; these exist by Claim 1.
Then w xp φD(d) and ψD(d) xp z for all d ∈ D. Thus,
κwD D φD ≺D βD ≺D ψD D κzD,
17Actually, we only need to obtain an upper and lower bound for clos[α′(S)] in X . But constructing a
maximum and minimum is no more difficult.
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where the “D” comparisons are by axiom (Dom), and the “≺D” comparisons are by
the definitions of φD and ψD. Thus,
u(w) = ED[u ◦ κwD] <
(∗)
ED[u ◦ β] <
(∗)
ED[u ◦ κzD] = u(z),
where both (∗) are because of the assumed SEU representation. Thus, u(w) < ED[u ◦
β] < u(z). Now, u is continuous, and X is connected. Thus, the Intermediate Value
Theorem yields x, y ∈ X such that ED[u ◦ β] −  < u(x) < ED[u ◦ β] < u(y) <
ED[u ◦ β] + . (It is even possible that w and z themselves already satisfy these
inequalities). Thus,
ED[u ◦ κxD] = u(x) < ED[u ◦ β] < u(y) = ED[u ◦ κyD],
so κxD ≺D βD ≺D κyD, by the assumed SEU representation. Thus, if we define OD :=
(κxD, κ
y
D)D , then OD is open in the D-order topology, and βD ∈ OD. Furthermore,
for any ωD ∈ OD, we have κxD ≺D ωD ≺D κyD, and thus,
ED[u ◦ β]−  <
()





ED[u ◦ κyD] = u(y) <
()
ED[u ◦ β] + ,
so that |ED[u ◦ωD]−ED[u ◦ βD]| < , as desired. Here, the (∗) inequalities are by the
assumed SEU representation, and () inequalities are by the definitions of x and y.
(Case 2) Suppose βD is D-maximal in A(D), but not D-minimal. The logic is
similar to Case 1, so we will be more cursory. There exists some φD ∈ A(D) such that
φD ≺D βD. As in Case 1, use Claim 1 to obtain some w ∈ X such that w xp φD(d)
for all d ∈ D. Thus, κwD D φD ≺D βD, and thus, u(w) = ED[u ◦ κwD] < ED[u ◦ β].
Now, u is continuous, and X is connected, so the Intermediate Value Theorem yields
x ∈ X such that ED[u◦β]− < u(x) < ED[u◦β]. Thus, ED[u◦κxD] = u(x) < ED[u◦β],
so κxD ≺D βD. Thus, if we define OD := (κxD,→)D , then OD is open in the D-order
topology, and βD ∈ OD; in fact, βD is a D-maximal element of OD. Thus, for any
ωD ∈ OD, we have κxD ≺D ωD D βD, and thus,
ED[u◦β]−  <
()




ED[u◦β] < ED[u◦β] + ,
as desired. Here, the (∗) inequalities are by the assumed SEU representation, and the
() inequality is by the definition of x.
(Case 3) Suppose βD is D-minimal in A(D), but not D-maximal. The logic is
exactly the same as Case 2, but with all the preferences and inequalities reversed.
(Case 4) Suppose βD is both D-minimal and D-maximal in A(D). In this case,
ED[u ◦ ω] = ED[u ◦ β] for all ω ∈ A(D). Thus, if we define OD := A(D), then the
claim is trivially satisfied. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: There exist a subset OE ⊆ A(E), open in the E -order topology, such that
βE ∈ OE , and such that |EE [u ◦ ωE ]− EE [u ◦ βE ]| <  for all ωE ∈ OE .
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Proof. The argument is identical to Claim 2. 3 Claim 3
Now let ω ∈ A(G), and suppose ωD ∈ OD and ωE ∈ OE . Then









EE [u ◦ β] + 
)
(∗) µ[G] (EG[u ◦ β] + ) ≤
()
µ[G]EG[u ◦ γ].
Here, both (∗) are by equation (6), (†) is by the inequalities in Claims 2 and 3, and the
full support of µ while () is by the definition of . Thus, EG[u ◦ ω] < EG[u ◦ γ]. Thus,
by the presumed SEU representation ω ≺G γ. By an identical argument, EG[u ◦ ω] >
EG[u ◦ α], and thus, ω G α. Thus, ω ∈ (α, γ)G , and thus, ω ∈ O, as desired. 2
B Proofs of other results
Proof of Theorem 2. Let S∗ be the Stone space of the Boolean algebra B —that is, the set
of all Boolean algebra homomorphisms from B into {T, F}. Let Clp(S∗) be the set of all
clopen subsets of S∗; this is a Boolean algebra under the standard set-theoretic operations
of union, intersection, and complementation. The Stone Representation Theorem says
there is a Boolean algebra isomorphism Φ : B−→Clp(S∗) given by Φ(B) = B∗ for all
B ∈ B, where B∗ := {s∗ ∈ S∗; s∗(B) = T}.
“⇐=” Suppose µ∗ is a Borel probability measure on S∗ with full support, and u :
X−→R is a D-measurable function that together provide a Stonean SEU representation
of {B}B∈B as in formula (8). For all B ∈ B, define µ[B] := µ∗[B∗]. In other words,
µ := µ∗ ◦ Φ. Then µ is a credence on B, because Φ is a Boolean algebra isomorphism
from B to Clp(S∗), and µ∗ is a finitely additive probability measure when restricted
to Clp(S∗). Furthermore, Theorem PV-8.4 says that EµB[u ◦ α] =
∫
B∗ u ◦ α∗ dµ∗ for all
α ∈ A; thus, (u, µ) provides an SEU representation as in formula (7). Meanwhile, µ∗
has full support, so µ∗[B∗] > 0 for all B∗ ∈ Clp(S∗), and hence, µ[B] > 0 for all B ∈ B;
thus µ also has full support. Thus, Theorem 1 says that {B}B∈B satisfies the axioms
(CEq), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), (M) and (TC).
“=⇒” If {B}B∈B satisfies Axioms (CEq), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), (M), and (TC),
then Theorem 1 says it has an SEU representation (7) given by a credence µ on B
with full support, and a D-measurable utility function u : X−→R. Let E be the µ-
compatible conditional expectation structure from Proposition A4. Define the func-
tion µ∗ : Clp(S∗)−→[0, 1] by setting µ∗(B∗) := µ[B] for all B ∈ B —in other words,
µ∗ := µ ◦ Φ−1. This is a finitely additive probability measure on Clp(S∗) because Φ−1
is a Boolean algebra isomorphism from Clp(S∗) to B. Theorem PV-8.4 says that µ∗
extends to a unique Borel probability measure µ∗ on S∗ such that, for any g ∈ GB(S)
and B ∈ B, we have EµB[g] =
∫
B∗ g




B∗ u ◦α∗ dµ∗ (because (u ◦α)∗ = u ◦α∗). Applying this identity to the SEU
representation (7), we obtain a Stonean SEU representation as in formula (8).
Full support. µ[B] > 0 for every nonempty B ∈ B. Thus, µ∗[B∗] > 0 for every nonempty
B∗ ∈ Clp(S∗). But S∗ is totally disconnected, so Clp(S∗) is a base for the topology of
S∗. Thus, we deduce that µ∗[O∗] > 0 for every nonempty open subset O∗ ⊆ S∗.
Uniqueness. Suppose that both (u1, µ
∗
1) and (u2, µ
∗
2) provide Stonean SEU represen-
tation for {B}B∈B. Let µ1 := µ∗1 ◦ Φ and µ2 := µ∗2 ◦ Φ; these are credences on B,
and by Theorem PV-8.4, they both provide SEU representations as in formula (7). By
uniqueness in Theorem 1, u1 and u2 are positive affine transformations of each other,





Proof of Theorem 3. In Theorem 1, the D-measurability of u first serves to obtain
axiom (M). But this is not needed here. Moreover, D-measurability is used to show
the continuity of u, which we invoke in the proofs of (CEq) and (CCP). But here the
continuity of u is part of the representation. To prove the necessity of the axioms,
we can therefore proceed here exactly as in Theorem 1. As for the sufficiency of the
axioms, note that Lemmas A1 and A2, as well as Proposition A3, all remain valid if one
replaces axiom (M) with the weaker axiom (C) — at least, if one removes the conclusion
that u be D-measurable from the latter result. Likewise, Proposition A6 is still true
with axiom (C) instead of axiom (M). Indeed, in the proof of this proposition, the D-
measurability of u is only used to make sure that u◦α is B-comeasurable for any α ∈ A.
Here, since u and α are continuous, u ◦α is also continuous, and therefore automatically
R(S)-measurable for any α ∈ A, by Proposition PV-5.4(a). Thus, essentially the same
proof as for Theorem 1 provides the SEU representation. Finally, the uniqueness of
the representation can be obtained exactly as in Theorem 1 since the argument invoked
there uses neither axiom (M) nor D-measurability, but only axiom (C) and continuity.
2
Proof of Theorem 4. The proofs for the necessity of Axioms (M), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), and
(TC) are the same as in Theorem 1 because these proofs do not invoke the boundedness
of the acts in A. However, the proof of (CEq) is different. Let B ∈ B be nonempty and
let α ∈ A. We need to find x ∈ S such that αB ≈B κxB. Given the SEU representation,
it is sufficient to show that EB[u ◦ α] ∈ u(X ). Let a := inf u(X ) and b := sup u(X ).
Since S is connected and u is continuous, u(X ) is an interval of R. Therefore, we are in
one of the following four cases.
Case 1: u(X ) = [a, b]. There exist then x, y ∈ X such that u(x) = a and u(y) = b.
Moreover, we necessarily have u(y) ≥ u◦α(s) ≥ u(x) for any s ∈ B. By the monotonicity
of the expectation functionals, we have b = u(y) ≥ EB[u ◦ α] ≥ u(x) = a. This shows
that EB[u ◦ α] ∈ u(X ).
43
Case 2: u(X ) = [a, b). By proceeding as in Case 1, we obtain EB[u ◦ α] ≥ a. The
remainder of the proof requires the following claim.
Claim 1: There exists r < b such that B ∩ int((u ◦ α)−1(−∞, r]) is nonempty.
Proof. For any r ∈ u(X ), let Br := int((u ◦ α)−1(−∞, r]). To conclude, it is sufficient to









B ∩ Br. (B2)
Since B is nonempty by assumption, formula (B2) will imply that B∩Br is nonempty
for some r ∈ u(X ). But u(X ) = [a, b). So we will have r < b.
To show formula (B1), fix s ∈ S. Then, u ◦ α(s) ∈ u(X ) = [a, b). So we can
find r such that u ◦ α(s) < r < b. Therefore, s ∈ (u ◦ α)−1(−∞, r). But the latter
set is open in S because both u and α are continuous. Moreover, it is contained in
(u ◦ α)−1(−∞, r]. So s ∈ int((u ◦ α)−1(−∞, r]) := Br. Hence formula (B1). 3 Claim 1
Now, let P := B ∩ int((u ◦ α)−1(−∞, r]). Since u is D-measurable and α is (B,D)-
comeasurable, u ◦ α is B-comeasurable. See Proposition PV-5.4(a). Therefore, P ∈
B. Set Q := ¬P ∩ B, another (possibly empty) element of B. Then, {P ,Q} is a of
incompatible subsets in B whose join equals B. (If Q was nonempty, this would be a
B-partition of B.) Moreover, for any s ∈ P , we have (u ◦ α)(s) ≤ r. Then, by the
monotonicity of the expectation functionals, we obtain EP [u ◦ α] ≤ r. Moreover, we
have (u ◦ α)(s) ≤ b for any s ∈ Q so, still by monotonicity, EQ[u ◦ α] ≤ b. Therefore,
EB[u ◦ α] (a) µ[P ]EP [u ◦ α] + µ[Q]EQ[u ◦ α] ≤
(b)
µ[P ] r + µ[Q] b
<
(c)
µ[P ] b+ µ[Q] b
(d)
b,
where (a) is by Formula 6, (b) is because EP [u◦α] ≤ r and EQ[u◦α] ≤ b, (c) is by Claim
1, because r < b and µ(P) > 0 since P is nonemptu and µ has full support, and finally
(d) is because µ is a credence. Summing up, we have a ≤ EB[u ◦ α] < b and, therefore,
EB[u ◦ α] ∈ u(X ).
Case 3: u(X ) = (a, b]. The proof is similar to that of Case 2.
Case 4: u(X ) = (a, b). The proof uses the same arguments as in Cases 2 and 3.
In all cases, we have EB[u◦α] ∈ u(X ). Thus, (CEq) holds, and all axioms are necessary
for the SEU representation. As for its uniqueness, suppose that (u, µ) provides an SEU
representation of {B}B∈B on A. Then, (u, µ) also provides an SEU representation to
the restriction of {B}B∈B to the set Ab of all bounded acts in A. Moreover, thanks to
(Rch*), these restricted preferences satisfy (Rch). So, by Theorem 1, u is unique up to
positive affine transformation and µ is unique.
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We now come to the sufficiency of the axioms. By (Rch*), the restriction of {B}B∈B
to the set Ab of all bounded acts in A satisfies (Rch). Moreover, it satisfies all of Axioms
(CEq), (M), (Dom), (Sep), (CCP), and (TC). Then, by Theorem 1, these restricted pref-
erence have an SEU representation (u, µ), where u is D-measurable (hence continuous)





EB[u ◦ α] ≥ EB[u ◦ β].
)
(B3)
Now, suppose that u is not bounded from above. Then, we can easily find a sequence
{xn, n ∈ N} of points in X such that, for any n ∈ N,
u(xn) · µ(Pn) ≥ 1 and u(xn+1) > u(xn). (B4)
Moreover, let {Pn, n ∈ N} be a countable B-partition as in condition (Exh).
Claim 2: There exists α ∈ A such that αPn ≈Pn κxnPn for any n ∈ N and α S κx for
any x ∈ X .
Proof. We first construct a sequence {αn, n ∈ N} of elements of conditional acts. Let
α1 := κx1P1 ∈ A(P1). Clearly, we have α1 ≈P1 κx1P1 and α1(s) xp x1 for any s ∈ P1.
Now, we have u(x2) > u(x1) by formula (B4). So, by formula B3, we obtain
κx2P2 P2 κx1P2 . Since we have additionally α1(s) xp x1 for any s ∈ P1, (Rch*) provides
an act α2 ∈ A(P1 ∨ P2) such that α2P1 = α1, α2 ≈P2 κx2P2 and α2(s) xp x1 for any
s ∈ P2. But, since α2P1 = α1, by the previous paragraph, we also have α2(s) xp x1
for any s ∈ P1. In other words, P1 ∪ P2 ⊆ α2−1[{x ∈ X , x xp x1}]. Since the latter
set is closed by axiom (M) and the continuity of α, we further have clos(P1 ∪ P2) ⊆
α2
−1
[{x ∈ X , x xp x1}]. Then, P1 ∨ P2 = int(clos(P1 ∪ P2)) ⊆ α2−1[{x ∈ X ,
x xp x1}]. In other words, α2(s) xp x1 for any s ∈ P1 ∨ P2.
Iterative applications of this construction provide, for each n ≥ 3, an act αn ∈
A(P1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn) such that
(a) αnP1∨...∨Pn−1 = α
n−1,
(b) αnPn ≈Pn κxnPn ,
(c) αn(s) xp x1 for any s ∈ P1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn.
Now, fix s ∈ S. By condition (Exh), there exists n ≥ 1 such that s ∈ P1 ∨ . . .∨Pn.
Then, set Ns := P1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn, an open neighborhood of s. For any m > n, Property
(a) implies αm(s) = αm−1(s) = . . . = αn(s). Thus, the sequence {αm(s), m ∈ N} is
constant from a certain rank and, therefore, converges. Let α(s) be its limit. This
defines a function α from S to X and we have α(s) = αn(s). In fact, proceeding
the way we just did for s, we can show α(s′) = αn(s′) for any s′ ∈ Ns. But αn is
continuous. So α is locally continuous at any point in S and, therefore, continuous
as well. Moreover, we have just constructed a neighborhood Ns of each s ∈ S such
that αNs = α
n
Ns with α




Ns . By (Loc), α must be an element of A. In addition, since we have
α(s) = αn(s), property (c) implies
α(s) xp x1, (B5)
and this holds for any s ∈ S. Moreover, for any n ∈ N, αP1∨...∨Pn = αnP1∨...∨Pn . Then,
αPn = α
n
Pn So, by property (b),
αPn ≈Pn κxnPn (B6)
Now, fix x ∈ X . We will show α S κx. Let N ≥ 1 be such that
N∑
n=1
µ(Pn) · u(xn) ≥ u(x). (B7)
Such an integer N exists thanks to Formula (B4). Let Q := ¬(P1 ∨ . . . ∨ PN). By
finitely many iterations of (Rch*), we can construct β ∈ Ab such that βQ = κx1Q and
βPn ≈Pn κxnPn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Since β is bounded, its expected utility ES [u ◦ β]
is well defined. We even have












µ(Pn) · u(xn) ≥
(e)
u(x),
where (a) and (b) are by formula (6), (c) is because βQ = κ
x1
Q and βPn ≈Pn κxnPn for
any n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and by formula (B3), (d) is because u(x1) ≥ 0 by formula (B4),
and (e) is by formula (B7). Then, by formula (B3), we obtain β S κx. On the
other hand, we have βPn ≈Pn κxnPn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. By formula (B6), we obtain
βPn ≈Pn αPn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then, by Lemma A5, β¬Q ≈¬Q κxn¬Q. Moreover,
we have βQ = κ
x1
Q and, by formula (B5) and (Dom), αQ Q κx1Q . So αQ Q βQ and,
by (Sep), α S β. Since we have β S κx, we finally obtain α S κx. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: There exists α′ ∈ A such that α′  α.
Proof. Let {Pn, n ∈ N} be the countable B-partition of S from condition (Exh) and set
Q := ¬P1 ∈ B. By (CEq), the act α from Claim 3 has a certainty equivalent for Q;
that is, α ≈Q κxQ for some x ∈ X . By (Rch*), there exists α′ ∈ A such that α′P1 = κx2P1
and α′Q ≈Q κxQ. Then, α′ satisfies
α′P1 ≈P1 κx2P1 and α′Q ≈Q αQ. (B8)
Now, since we have assumed u(x2) > u(x1), formula (B3) yields κ
x2
P1 P1 κx1P1 . By
Claim 2 and the first indifference from formula (B8), we obtain α′P1 P1 αP1 . Then,
the second indifference from formula (B8) and (Sep) finally give α′  α. 3 Claim 3
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By (CEq), there exist x, x′ ∈ X such that α ≈S κx and α′ ≈S κx′ . Then, by Claim 2,
α S κx′ so α S α′. But this contradicts the conclusion of Claim 3, thereby showing
that u must be bounded from above. A symmetric argument shows that u is bounded
from below and, therefore, bounded. Then, the utility profile u ◦ α of any α ∈ A(B) is
bounded on any B ∈ B (as well as continuous and B-comeasurable), and the expected
utility EB[u ◦ α] of α on B is well-defined.
Claim 4: For any B ∈ B, any α ∈ A(B) and any x ∈ X , if α ≈B κxB, then
EB[u ◦ α] = u(x).
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition A6. There, the boundedness of
acts is not really used per se, but rather because it implies bounded utility profiles.
Since u is here bounded, all utility profiles are bounded and the same argument as in
Proposition A6 applies. 3 Claim 4
Finally, for any B ∈ B and α, β ∈ A(B), axiom (CEq) yields x, y ∈ X such that




















EB[u ◦ α] ≥ EB[u ◦ β]
)
.
Here, (∗) is by axiom (Dom), (†) is because u is an ordinal utility function for xp by
formula (B3), and () is by Claim 4. Hence the SEU representation on A. 2
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